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SUMMARY
Focusing on issues that have not been fully explored in the sustainable operations and
supply chain management literature, this dissertation comprises three essays covering two
issues: the impact of public information dissemination regarding chemical hazards on re-
ductions in chemical emissions, and the implications of secondary markets on durable-
goods producers’ warranty-length decisions. The first essay (Chapter 2) empirically exam-
ines the association between changes in hazardous substance rankings and the voluntary
reductions in their emissions at the facility level, as well as the extent of efforts including
the use of source reduction and end-of-pipe treatment. The study also examines how these
relationships are moderated by operational leanness. The results suggest that the public in-
formation dissemination of chemical rankings—the relative hazard level of chemicals—is
effective to promote environmental actions, as indicated by the significant association be-
tween increases in the relative assessed hazard levels of chemicals and greater subsequent
reductions in emissions and the use of source reduction. In addition, the study also finds
that operational leanness may limit the ability of facilities to reduce emissions in response
to increases in relative assessed hazard levels. The second essay (Chapter 3) analytically
examines durable-goods producers’ warranty-length decisions in the presence of secondary
markets and how producers’ secondary market interference influences their decisions. The
study finds that with respect to the reliability of used products, the benefit of offering longer
warranties is non-monotonic when a secondary market is present. It also shows that sec-
ondary market interference significantly influences producers’ warranty-length decisions.
In addition to the conventional wisdom that producers benefit from offering longer war-
ranties when product reliability is a concern, producers engaging in secondary market inter-
ference may find that offering longer warranties is more profitable when their used products
are sufficiently reliable. The third essay (Chapter 4) then empirically examines predictions
drawn from the analytical findings in the US automobile market. The results show sup-
viii
port for a U-shaped relationship between automobile producers’ warranty lengths and their
used-vehicle reliability. Specifically, automobile producers offer longer non-power-train
related warranties when the reliability of their used vehicles is near an extreme, either low
or high. This study also documents the relationship between the extent of producers’ buy-
back activities and their used-vehicle reliability, and that between secondary market trade




Motivated by personal experience interacting with operations managers in the field, this
dissertation examines issues that have not been fully explored in the sustainable opera-
tions and supply chain management literature, including the impact of public information
dissemination regarding chemical hazards on reductions in chemical emissions and the im-
plications of secondary markets on durable-goods producers’ warranty-length decisions.
This dissertation comprises three essays relating to these two issues: the first essay empir-
ically examines the association between changes in hazardous substance rankings and the
voluntary reductions in their emissions at the facility level; the second essay uses a nor-
mative model, focuses on the profitability of a durable-goods producer’s warranty-length
decision, and investigates the implications of the presence of a secondary market and the
impact of the producer’s secondary market interference on the decision; the third essay
draws predictions from the analytical findings in the previous essay and empirically tests
them using data from the US automobile market.
The public dissemination of information about the hazards of chemicals can be ex-
pected to lead to pressure on facilities or firms to undertake voluntary environmental ac-
tions. While the US Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) pro-
vides extensive public information about the potential hazards of a wide range of industrial
chemicals and ranks chemicals by their relative assessed hazard level, limited empirical
research has been devoted to examining (i) the link between such informational approaches
and firms’ voluntary environmental efforts, and (ii) the implications of firms operational
characteristics on the extent and the nature of these efforts. In the first essay, titled “Are
Hazardous Substance Rankings Effective? An Empirical Investigation of Changing Assess-
ments of the Relative Hazards of Chemicals and Voluntary Emissions Reductions” (Chapter
1
2), we enhance the understanding of these issues by empirically investigating facility-level
voluntary reductions in emissions and the nature of efforts (i.e., the use of source reduction
and end-of-pipe treatment) in relation to changes in chemical ranks—the relative assessed
hazard levels of the chemicals. We also examine the moderating effects of operational
leanness, an attribute that previous studies have found to be associated with better envi-
ronmental performance, on these relationships. To test our hypotheses, we draw data from
four secondary data sources: the Substance Priority List from the ATSDR, the Toxics Re-
lease Inventory from the EPA, the National Establishment Time-Series, and Compustat,
and employ a two-way fixed-effects panel model to control for various facility and industry
factors.
Through this study, we demonstrate that increases in relative assessed hazard levels
are associated with greater reductions in emissions and increased use of source reduction,
suggesting that information dissemination is effective to promote environmental actions. In
other words, we find evidence that managers may recognize changes in the relative assessed
hazard level of chemicals, internalize associated risks, and undertake voluntary actions
accordingly. We also find evidence that operational leanness, which aims to eliminate waste
and reduce variability, may limit the ability of facilities to reduce emissions in response to
increases in the relative assessed hazard level. These new insights will help operations
and environmental managers fine-tune their expectations about the impact of adopting lean
practices. Furthermore, we highlight the implications of facility and industry characteristics
on the effectiveness of such information dissemination.
In the second essay, titled “Product Warranty Lengths and Secondary Market Inter-
ference” (Chapter 3), we examine producers’ decisions regarding their product warranty
lengths in durable-goods markets. The motivation for this study came from discussions
with aftermarket operations managers concerning the implications of product warranties
on the secondary market for their products. After a thorough review of the literature, we
realize that the impact of warranties in the presence of secondary markets has not been
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fully examined. We therefore set out to explore the implications of product warranties in
durable-goods markets where secondary markets typically prevail.
To this end, we developed a durable-goods market model that focuses on benefits from
warranty coverage in the context of a product that is reliable to an extent and incorporates
a producer’s incentives to interfere with the secondary market (specifically through buy-
backs). Analysis of this model formulation under three different scenarios: (i) without a
secondary market, (ii) with a secondary market but no secondary market interference, and
(iii) with secondary market interference, has allowed us to characterize conditions under
which offering longer product warranties is more profitable, and to explore the implications
of the presence of the secondary market and the impact of the producer’s secondary market
interference. This analysis helped identify surprising insights: in the presence of a sec-
ondary market, the warranty-length decision is non-monotonic with respect to used-product
reliability; secondary market interference through a buy-back program significantly influ-
ences the warranty-length decision. In addition to the conventional wisdom that producers
benefit from offering longer warranties when product reliability is a concern, we find that
durable-goods producers engaging in secondary market interference may find that it is more
profitable to offer longer warranties when their used products are sufficiently reliable.
In the third essay, titled “Empirical Tests of Product Reliability on Product Warranty
Lengths and Secondary Markets” (Chapter 4), we draw predictions from the analytical
findings and empirically test them in the US automobile market. In this study, we link
secondary data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey by the US Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, the Vehicle Dependability Study from J. D. Power, and the detailed warranty coverage
information collected by JL Warranty. We apply the exploratory factor analysis to identify
key factors in automobile producers’ warranties and deploy panel-data models to control
for various factors. The results show support for a U-shaped relationship between automo-
bile producers’ warranty lengths and their used-vehicle reliability. Specifically, automobile
producers offer longer non-power-train related warranties when the reliability of their used
3
vehicles is near an extreme, either low or high. The study further shows that the associa-
tion between the extent of producers’ buy-back activities and their used-vehicle reliability
is negative, and that the relationship between trade volume in the secondary market and
used-vehicle reliability is positive. Both are in line with the analytical predictions.
The studies in the second and third essays together offer a compelling explanation to
durable-goods producers’ decisions on the length of product warranties with respect to
product reliability. Offering longer warranties can be profitable when the reliability of
used products and the engagement of secondary market interference are properly aligned.
Durable-goods producers should evaluate their warranty-length decisions jointly with their
decisions on secondary market interference.
4
CHAPTER 2
ARE HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE RANKINGS EFFECTIVE? AN EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATION OF CHANGING ASSESSMENTS OF THE RELATIVE
HAZARDS OF CHEMICALS AND VOLUNTARY EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS
2.1 Introduction
Enacting environmental legislation, such as limits on emissions, requires detailed cost and
benefit assessments, involves many players, typically proceeds in a long-drawn fashion,
and, thus, has an uncertain outcome (Beavis & Dobbs 1986, Hartl 1992, Batabyal 1995,
Drake & Just 2016). In contrast, despite not directly regulating the behavior of facilities
or firms, information-based regulatory approaches—such as the dissemination of informa-
tion on the potential hazards of chemicals or the requirement of disclosure of emissions
of certain chemicals (e.g., as is required under the United States Environmental Protection
Agencys (US EPAs) Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program)—result in public awareness
of chemical hazards and the environmental implications of facilities or firms operations.
This awareness can be expected to lead to public pressure on facilities or firms to internal-
ize the risks revealed by the information.
An example of the public dissemination of information on chemicals is the Substance
Priority List (SPL), published by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR). Established under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980, commonly known as the Superfund Act, ATSDR is the main
source of information about the health effects of exposure to hazardous chemicals and is
responsible for maintaining toxicological databases and disseminating information to other
governmental agencies and public health professionals (ATSDR 2009, 2012). ATSDR
gathers information on the hazards of chemical substances, ranks chemicals in the SPL
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based on toxicity, frequency of occurrence at polluted sites, and probability of human expo-
sure, and biennially publishes a list of the top 275 chemicals. The agency prioritizes these
chemicals for continuing toxicological research efforts and the compilation and dissemi-
nation of their toxicological profiles to the public (ATSDR 1994a, 1994b, 2014). Changes
in the ranks of chemicals in the SPL are often referenced in industry news outlets and
publications (Keiser 2003, Pearl 2008, Paul et al. 2015).
Another example of the public dissemination of information by a governmental agency,
albeit less exhaustive, is the National Toxicology Program (NTP), which publishes the
Report on Carcinogens (RoC). This report identifies chemical substances that are known to
or are anticipated to cause cancer in humans. In addition to governmental agencies, non-
governmental organizations also disseminate information on chemical hazards; examples
include the SIN (Substitute It Now!) List (International Chemical Secretariat 2014) and the
Dirty Laundry Report (Greenpeace 2011).
The toxicological information prepared by ATSDR is referenced in various regulatory
programs, including the TRI program. In addition, ATSDR also assists other agencies
in determining future regulations pertaining to chemical substances (ATSDR 2009). For
example, in 2002, the agency recommended pentachlorophenol—a hazardous chemical
ranked 43 in the 2001 SPL as a candidate for the RoC (NTP 2002, 2012). Subsequently, the
substance became a new member in the RoC in 2014 (NTP 2014) and firms have since been
required to warn employees about their exposure to the chemical (US OSHA Regulation
29 CFR Part 1910.1200(d)(4)).
As an outcome of progress in toxicological research, the relative assessed hazard levels
of chemicals—reflected in the form of their ranks in the SPL—are dynamic. For example,
environmental studies have reflected growing concerns about the use of trichlorobenzenes
(TCBs), which are commonly used as dye carriers in polyester dyeing processes (World
Health Organization 2004). The SPL rank of one of its variants, 1, 2, 3-TCB, advanced
from 334 in 1992 to 137 in 2015. Concurrently, in addition to implementing new tech-
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nologies to reduce the use of water and chemicals in its dyeing processes, Nike encouraged
its suppliers to specifically phase out TCBs from their manufacturing processes (Nike Inc.
2016, Zero Discharge of Hazardous Chemicals 2016). Another example is glycol ethers, a
group of ether-based solvents and cleaning agents that are widely used in industrial clean-
ing. As the rank of glycol ethers in the SPL advanced from 575 in 1992 to 319 in 2015,
the use of these solvents attracted considerable media attention, and industrial cleaning
firms have been actively seeking a substitute (Quaker Chemical Corp 2015, Substitution
Support Portal 2015c,b,a). The above anecdotal evidence may suggest that firms acknowl-
edge the assessments of chemical hazards and undertake voluntary environmental actions
in response. Moreover, studies in the environmental management literature suggest that
emissions reductions efforts, driven by the management of business risk, should reflect the
hazards of chemicals released by a firms facilities (Reinhardt 1999, Kleindorfer & Saad
2005). When a chemical is found to potentially cause greater harm as compared to other
chemicals, firms can expect higher future costs for environmental compliance and con-
sumer and occupational liabilities related to that chemical (Kraft et al. 2013). Thus, when
the relative assessed hazard level of a particular chemical substance increases (reflected as
upward movement in the SPL), firms can be expected to be more likely to prioritize vol-
untary reductions of emissions of that chemical. On the other hand, it is also possible that
firms may not voluntarily or proactively respond to information such as in the SPL and may
wait for the enactment of regulations before taking action.
Although governmental organizations such as ATSDR provide periodically-updated
public information about the potential hazards of specific chemicals, limited empirical re-
search has been devoted to examining: (1) the link between such information and the vol-
untary environmental efforts of facilities that use these chemicals, and (2) the implications
of the operational characteristics of the facilities on the extent and nature of these efforts.
We add to the understanding of these relationships by investigating voluntary reductions
in chemical emissions in relation to changes in the relative assessed hazard levels of the
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chemicals, as evidenced in the periodically-updated SPL published by ATSDR. To capture
voluntary reductions of chemical emissions, we use data from the TRI. The TRI Program
mandates facility-level reporting and public disclosure of emissions of over 650 chemicals.
Since the establishment of the program, the amount of reported emissions in the manufac-
turing sector has declined by more than half (EPA 2014). TRI data has been extensively
used in the literature to examine voluntary environmental actions (e.g. Hart & Ahuja 1996,
Klassen & Whybark 1999, King & Lenox 2001, 2002, Toffel & Marshall 2004, Doshi et al.
2013).
Within efforts to reduce chemical emissions, the two broad categories of practices em-
ployed are source reduction and end-of-pipe (EOP) treatment. Source reduction (also re-
ferred to as pollution prevention), which includes changing product designs and modify-
ing production processes to avoid pollution, has been recommended as a way to achieve
better environmental performance, gain competitive advantages, promote innovation, and
improve financial performance (Klassen & Whybark 1999, King & Lenox 2002). On the
other hand, EOP treatment (also referred to as pollution control) includes the use of equip-
ment or methods to recycle, burn, or neutralize (i.e., treat) pollutants. While EOP treatment
is typically not regarded to be as strategically valuable as source reduction, it requires no
modifications to existing product designs and has a limited disruptive effect on production
processes (Klassen & Whybark 1999, Dutt & King 2014). Both categories of practices
are prevalent, and many studies have examined the implications of effort levels within the
two categories in various contexts (Hart & Ahuja 1996, Klassen & Whybark 1999, King
& Lenox 2002, Kroes et al. 2012). We contribute to this literature stream by investigating
the nature of facilities emission reduction efforts when the relative assessed hazard levels
of chemicals change over time.
Perhaps the most significant operations management practice pertinent to proactive en-
vironmental actions, or actions beyond regulatory compliance, is lean operations. Broadly
defined, lean operations is a principle that aims to eliminate waste and reduce variability
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(Hopp & Spearman 2004, Shah & Ward 2007). The phrase lean is green has emerged due
to the rationale that, because of the focus on waste (including emissions), leaner facilities
or firms can be expected to achieve better financial performance, as well as better envi-
ronmental performance (King & Lenox 2001, Kleindorfer et al. 2005, Corbett & Klassen
2006). However, certain studies have empirically shown in various contexts that opera-
tional leanness might be disadvantageous in a dynamic environment (Rothenberg et al.
2001, Kleindorfer & Saad 2005, Azadegan et al. 2013, Eroglu & Hofer 2014). Specif-
ically, when the business environment is more competitive or faces greater uncertainty,
facilities or firms with more closely integrated operations with less slack are less flexible
to adapt than those that allow operational buffers. We therefore examine how operational
leanness moderates the relationship between changes in the relative assessed hazard levels
of chemicals and facilities voluntary reductions in emissions of the chemicals, as well as
their use of source reduction and EOP treatment for the chemicals.
To summarize, we investigate facilities reductions in chemical emissions and their use
of source reduction and EOP treatment in relation to changes in the relative assessed hazard
levels of the chemicals, as evidenced in their SPL ranks over time. In addition, we examine
the moderating effects of operational leanness on these relationships. To test our hypothe-
ses, we draw secondary data from four sources—the SPL from the ATSDR, the TRI from
the US EPA, the National Establishment Time-Series, and Compustat. We employ a panel
model with facility-chemical- and time-fixed effects and control for various facility and
industry factors. We find that public information dissemination on the relative hazards of
chemicals is effective, as indicated by the significant association between increases in the
relative assessed hazard levels of chemicals and greater subsequent emissions reductions
as well as the increased use of source reduction. We also find that operational leanness has
an overall positive effect, i.e., leaner facilities outperform less lean facilities with regard to
emissions reductions. However, we find partial support for a negative moderation effect of
operational leanness on emissions reductions, i.e., when the relative assessed hazard level
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increases, less lean facilities increase their emissions reductions more than leaner facilities.
In addition, we find partial support for a positive moderation effect of operational lean-
ness on the use of EOP treatment. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first in
the environmental management and sustainable operations literatures to analyze the effects
of publicly-disseminated information pertaining to the relative assessed hazard levels of
chemicals on the voluntary emissions reduction efforts of facilities using those chemicals,
while also providing insights into the implications of operational leanness.
2.2 Literature and Hypotheses
Reinhardt (1999) examined the forces that motivate firms to develop beyond-compliance
strategies and to take voluntary environmental actions, and categorized them into one risk-
oriented force (i.e., business risk management) and three profit-oriented forces: (i) strategic
interaction, (ii) product differentiation, and (iii) free lunch. That is, (i) managers may ex-
pect advantages over rivals under imperfect market competition and may strategically take
preemptive actions such as interacting with governmental agencies or industrial groups on
regulating environmental behaviors, (ii) managers may seek to differentiate their products
and command price premiums by incorporating or accounting for environmental externali-
ties, and (iii) managers may enjoy cost savings by exposing existing inefficiencies through
beyond-compliance actions. Since the risk-oriented force is the only active force when
the immediate economic value of actions beyond compliance is negative, Reinhardt (1999)
suggested that this force is the fundamental driver of voluntary actions and claimed that
voluntary actions can reduce the probability or magnitude of losses from liability, damage
to reputation, and operational disruptions caused by future litigation or changes in regula-
tions. Berry & Rondinelli (1998) also proposed that the increasing cost of merely comply-
ing with legal requirements (that gradually become more stringent and complicated) drives
firms to take proactive environmental actions. Similarly, Reid & Toffel (2009) proposed
that beyond-compliance actions are a preemptive response by firms to mitigate future risks
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such as additional regulations and more stringent enforcements. Furthermore, when en-
hancing their risk management systems, firms quantitatively link factors such as customer
liability and employee safety to proactive, risk-reducing actions such as pollution preven-
tion (Kleindorfer & Saad 2005).
The dissemination of information about the potential hazards of chemicals and the
mandatory disclosure of chemical emissions by facilities result in public awareness of
chemical hazards and the environmental implications of facilities operations. This aware-
ness can be expected to lead to pressure on facilities to internalize the risks revealed by
the information (Kraft et al. 2013). The effects of mandatory disclosure on the use or
emissions of chemicals has been examined in different contexts (e.g., Doshi et al. 2013,
Kalkanci & Plambeck 2015). The literature, however, contains fewer studies pertaining to
the effects of information dissemination of chemical hazards by governmental agencies or
non-governmental organizations. One of these studies is by Gormley & Matsa (2011), who
hypothesized that chemicals newly added to the RoC expose firms that routinely use these
chemicals to significantly greater occupational liability in the form of legal fees, damage
payments, and insurance premiums. Using an event-study approach, they found that firms
exposed to the newly-added chemicals were more likely to take strategic actions such as
product diversification or expansion through acquisition, as compared to unexposed firms.
Similar to Gormley & Matsa (2011), we contend that facilities associate a higher relative
assessed hazard level for a chemical with greater likelihood of new or more stringent reg-
ulations, stricter enforcement, higher expected costs of ensuring occupational safety, or
greater liability for harm caused by the chemical to employees and the public, and there-
fore seek to address these risks in the form of voluntary reductions in the emissions of the
chemical.
A facility may either limit, at source, the amount of a chemical used within its pro-
cesses, or treat chemical waste using EOP methods, or perform both. Several studies have
indicated the need for facilities to dedicate efforts to both categories of practices in order
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to achieve reductions in emissions that go beyond compliance (Klassen & Whybark 1999,
Rothenberg et al. 2001, Kroes et al. 2012). Furthermore, Dutt & King (2014) examined
the relationship between source reduction and EOP treatment and found evidence that the
relationship is not substitutive but complementary. Thus, we posit that in order to respond
to an increase in the relative assessed hazard level of a chemical, facility managers may
increase the use of source reduction, increase the use of EOP treatment, or both, to achieve
reductions in emissions. We therefore hypothesize the following:
H1a: An increase in the relative assessed hazard level of a chemical is positively asso-
ciated with reductions in emissions of the chemical.
H1b: An increase in the relative assessed hazard level of a chemical is positively asso-
ciated with the use of source reduction for the chemical.
H1c: An increase in the relative assessed hazard level of a chemical is positively asso-
ciated with the use of EOP treatment for the chemical.
Closely related to voluntary emissions reductions is the practice of lean operations. Lean
operations involves the elimination of non-value-adding activities and waste, the reduction
of variability in supply, demand, and internal operations, and the continuous improvement
of these actions (Womack et al. 1990, Womack & Jones 1996, Hopp & Spearman 2004,
Narasimhan et al. 2006, Shah & Ward 2007). Studies in the sustainable operations lit-
erature suggest that the outcomes of practicing lean—(1) the identification and minimiza-
tion of waste, including emissions, (2) the empowerment of employees and facilitation of
their in-depth know-how of production processes, and (3) continuous improvements in all
aspects—help facilities achieve better operational and environmental performance simulta-
neously, yielding the lean is green concept (King & Lenox 2001, Kleindorfer et al. 2005,
Corbett & Klassen 2006).
The empirical study by King & Lenox (2001) showed a negative association between
the leanness of a facility (measured by the summation of the maximum inventory levels
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across all chemicals) and its overall emissions, i.e., evidence that leaner facilities have
lower overall emissions. Since the benefits of practicing lean, including a focused aware-
ness of waste and enhanced know-how of processes, could facilitate the prioritization of
waste reduction efforts and enhance the effectiveness of these efforts, operational leanness
can be expected to positively moderate emissions reductions when the relative assessed
hazard level of a chemical increases.
On the other hand, the literature also identifies certain limitations of leanness in a dy-
namic environment. When the business environment is dynamic, facilities or firms with
closely integrated operations and smoothed production processes resulting from practicing
lean are inhibited from adapting (Yusuf & Adeleye 2002, Narasimhan et al. 2006). Azade-
gan et al. (2013) found evidence that when a firm operates under sales uncertainty, a nega-
tive implication of lean operations on financial performance is likely to surface. Capturing
business dynamism in the form of changing intensity of market competition, Eroglu &
Hofer (2014) also observed a similar negative effect. In addition, Rothenberg et al. (2001)
found partial support for a negative association between emissions levels and leanness when
environmental managers in automotive assembly plants faced increasingly stringent emis-
sions standards over time. For our context, this would suggest that, when encountering
increases in the relative assessed hazard levels of chemicals used in their operations, leaner
facilities may not be able to reduce emissions as much as less lean facilities or, that op-
erational leanness may negatively moderate the relationship between increases in relative
assessed hazard levels and reductions in emissions. Based on the preceding discussion, we
offer the following competing hypotheses for the moderating effect of operation leanness:
H2a(b): Operational leanness positively (negatively) moderates reductions in emis-
sions of a chemical when the relative assessed hazard level of the chemical increases.
According to the principles of lean operations, waste and inefficiencies are resolved at the
source. Thus, leaner facilities can be expected to use source reduction to a greater extent
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than less lean ones. Similarly, since EOP methods only symptomatically treat problematic
chemicals at the end of the process, leaner facilities would be less likely to employ EOP
treatment. Overall, since reducing emissions at the source rather than treating them at the
end-of-pipe has a similar logic to incorporating quality at the source rather than inspecting
quality at the end of the process, managers at leaner firms can be expected to engage more
in source reduction and less in EOP treatment (King & Lenox 2001). Rothenberg et al.
(2001) found that managers of leaner facilities regard EOP treatment as the last resort,
and would rather explore efficiency improvements in production processes than increase
the use of EOP treatment unless regulations forced them to do so. Thus, when the relative
assessed hazard level of a chemical increases, managers at leaner facilities can be expected
to pursue source reduction for the chemical to a greater extent than less lean facilities.
Moreover, leaner facilities can be expected to pursue EOP treatment to a lesser extent than
less lean facilities. On the other hand, although King & Lenox (2001) proposed that leaner
firms would engage less in EOP treatment, they did not find empirical support for this
contention. Relatedly, certain empirical studies on lean operations (Azadegan et al. 2013,
Eroglu & Hofer 2014) have evidenced a trade-off between the minimization of slack and
the capability to cope with a dynamic environment; closely integrated production processes
at lean facilities may be unamenable to further source reduction activities, resulting in
EOP treatment being favored. Thus, when the relative assessed hazard level of a chemical
increases, managers at leaner facilities may be less able to implement source reduction and
may engage more in EOP treatment compared to managers at less lean facilities. Therefore,
we propose the following competing hypotheses:
H3a(b): Operational leanness positively (negatively) moderates the use of source re-
duction for a chemical when the relative assessed hazard level of the chemical increases.
H4a(b): Operational leanness positively (negatively) moderates the use of EOP treat-
ment for a chemical when the relative assessed hazard level of the chemical increases.
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2.3 Data, Variables, and Empirical Approach
2.3.1 Data
As discussed earlier, we use the SPL from the ATSDR (published to the Federal Regis-
ter biennially) as the data source for the relative assessed hazard levels of chemicals. To
determine facility-level voluntary reductions in chemical emissions and the use of source
reduction and EOP treatment, we use TRI data from the US EPA. For various facility and
industry controls, we draw data from two more sources: the National Establishment Time-
Series (NETS) data from Walls & Associates and the Compustat North America annual data
from Standard & Poors. The ATSDR did not publish the 2009 SPL because of a transition
to a new database. In addition, the EPA expanded the list of chemical substances that firms
were required to report to the TRI and lowered the reporting quantity thresholds of per-
sistent bio-accumulative toxic chemicals in 2000. To avoid potential implications of such
regulatory changes, we focus on the period 2001-2009. Since the SPL is published bienni-
ally, we define event year t based on the schedule of the SPL, i.e., t ∈ [2003, 2005, 2007],
and measure our variables based on these event years. Note that our data spans two years
before the earliest event year to two years after the latest event year (i.e., the period 2001-
2009) due to our measures of rank changes from the previous event year to the next and
emissions following the event years.
Substance Priority List (SPL)
As the lead agency for implementing the health-related provisions of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, ATSDR is charged to assess
the presence and nature of health hazards at specific Superfund sites, to help prevent or
reduce further exposure and the illnesses that result from such exposures, and to expand
the knowledge base about health effects from exposure to hazardous substances (ATSDR
2009).
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To determine the relative hazard levels (or the ranks) of chemical substances, the ATSDR
aggregates the points assigned to over 800 candidate chemicals based on three criteria: tox-
icity, frequency of occurrence at polluted sites, and probability of human exposure based on
concentration levels and types of exposure to populations around the sites (ATSDR 2014).
The chemicals are ranked in descending order based on their total points (i.e., the most
hazardous chemical is ranked #1). The top 275 chemicals constitute the SPL and receive
substantial focus. For these top 275 chemicals, the ATSDR is responsible for performing
additional toxicological tests, preparing detailed toxicological profiles, and distributing the
information to state officials, medical administrators, and other health professionals. This
information includes educational materials on the surveillance and screening of emissions,
and diagnoses and treatments of injuries and diseases related to human exposure to these
chemicals (ATSDR 2009, 2012, 2014). We focus our analysis on those chemical substances
that appeared in all the SPLs throughout the period of our study, noting that changes in their
ranks over time reflect changes in their relative assessed hazard levels1.
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI)
To capture chemical emissions by facilities and their use of source reduction or EOP treat-
ment, we use data from the TRI Basic Plus (version 12) dataset from the EPA. In addition to
the amounts of chemicals released into the environment (air, water, or land) by facilities, the
TRI also captures the amounts of the chemicals that are managed through recycling, energy
recovery, and treatment (EPA 2016). Chemicals in the TRI data are indexed by Chemical
Abstracts Service Registry Numbers, whereas facilities are indexed by facility identifica-
tion (FID) numbers assigned by the EPA. We illustrate the data captured in the TRI using
the conceptual waste flows in Figure 2.1. After merging the TRI data with the SPL, we ob-
tain a panel dataset with 43,400 observations, spanning 120 chemical substances and 9,130
facilities over the period 2001-2009.
1Only a total of 10 TRI-listed chemicals moved either in or out of the top 275 over the period of our study
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Figure 2.1: Waste flows captured in TRI data
Notes: Black arrows denote waste flows. The dotted line represents the effect of source reduction on the
waste generated from production processes. For each chemical c at facility i during year t, the TRI data
includes the amount of waste released (Releasei,c,t), the amounts of waste processed under energy recovery




+EnergyRecoveredi,c,t +Recycledi,c,t + Treatedi,c,t
+TransferredOffsitei,c,t
And,
EOPi,c,t = EnergyRecoveredi,c,t +Recycledi,c,t + Treatedi,c,t
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Compustat and NETS
For additional facility and industry information, we supplemented the merged SPL and
TRI data with National Establishment Time Series (NETS) and Compustat data. We first
matched the Dun and Bradstreet (DUNS) numbers in the NETS data with the EPA FIDs
to pull facility information such as SIC code and number of employees. Since facilities
may relocate and report to the TRI under various FIDs while their DUNS numbers remain
the same, we used the DUNS number as the primary facility identifier in assembling our
dataset. For our industry-level measures, we use data from Compustat and Compustat
Segments (which reports data by industry for firms that operate across multiple industries).
2.3.2 Variables and Measures
We employ a panel model that controls for various facility and industry factors. Below, we
discuss the dependent variables, main independent variables, and controls included in our
model.
Dependent Variables
Emissions Reductions: Since the SPL is biennial, we define event year t based on the release
year of the SPL, i.e., t ∈ [2003, 2005, 2007]. Because the SPL for an event year typically
becomes publicly available at the end of the year or the beginning of the following year2,
to avoid contamination, we consider the difference in emissions between the event year
and the second year after the event year. Specifically, we measure facility is emissions
reductions of chemical c as the ratio of the total quantity of the chemical released during
the second year after the event year, i.e., Releasei,c,t+2 to the quantity released during
the event year, i.e., Releasei,c,t. To suppress the effect of extreme values but maintain
approximate linearity of the ratio around the mode, we take the natural logarithm of the
2The 2003 SPL was published in November 2003, the 2005 SPL was published in December 2005, and
the 2007 SPL was published in March 2008.
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ratio and multiply it by 100. As a result, for moderate values of the ratio, our measure
can be regarded as an approximate percentage change (Kesavan et al. 2010, Dutt & King
2014). Lastly, for ease of interpretation, we apply a negative sign to the ratio to arrive at
the emissions reductions (ERi,c,t) for chemical c at facility i for event year t, as:





Use of source reduction: Source reduction (or pollution prevention), includes changing
product designs and modifying production processes to avoid pollution or waste. We cap-
ture a facilitys use of source reduction for a chemical as the change in the total amount
of waste of the chemical generated by the facilitys production processes (see Figure 2.1).
Using the TRI data, we calculate the total waste (TotalWastei,c,t) for chemical c at facility
i in year t by summing the quantities released, treated onsite, and transferred offsite, and
measure the use of source reduction (SRi,c,t) as:





Use of EOP treatment: EOP treatment (or pollution control) includes the use of equipment
or methods to burn, recycle, or neutralize (i.e., treat) pollutants. We capture the change in
the use of EOP treatment for a chemical at a facility as the ratio of the quantity of waste of
the chemical treated at the end of pipe onsite during the second year after the event year to
the quantity treated during the event year. In other words, we measure facility is change in
the use of EOP treatment(∆EOPi,c,t) for chemical c and event year t, as:







Change in relative assessed hazard level of a chemical: To capture the change in the relative
assessed hazard level of a chemical, we use a categorical measure, RelHazardc,t, which
indicates the direction of change in the rank (Rankc,t) of chemical c in event year t. Thus,
RelHazardc,t =

Increased if Rankc,t < Rankc,t−2
Decreased if Rankc,t < Rankc,t−2.
No Change if Rankc,t = Rankc,t−2
We observed from the SPL data that the No Change group typically included chemicals
at the top of the list (average rank of 49) whereas the Increased and Decreased groups were
more similar in the spread of the ranks of chemicals within them (average ranks of 140 and
177, respectively). We therefore choose the Decreased group as the reference group for our
analysis.3
Operational leanness. Lean operations closely relates to practices that minimize buffer
stocks or inventories. We construct a facility-level measure of leanness similar to the use-
of-inventory measure developed by King & Lenox (2001). For this purpose, we utilize data
on the maximum inventories of chemicals reported by each facility to the TRI. The max-
imum inventory of a chemical at a facility is the maximum total quantity of the chemical
across storage tanks, process vessels, on-site shipping containers, etc. at the facility at any
time during the reporting year.4 Using TRI data, we calculate the average of the maximum
inventories of the chemicals at a facility in the year subsequent to the event year5, take
the natural logarithm of this average, and mean-center the resulting value by industry at
3We performed a Chow test (Chow 1960, Greene 2003) to examine whether there are significant differ-
ences in parameter distributions between the No Change group and the Increased and Decreased groups. The
test failed to reject the null hypothesis of insignificant differences and we therefore include all three groups
in our estimations.
4Other aspects of practicing lean beyond inventory use, while of potential interest, are precluded from
consideration because of the limited availability of data.
5For each event year t, we measure operational leanness and the controls for market concentration and
facility size in year t + 1. However, our main results remain largely unchanged if for each event year t, we
measure them either in year t+ 2 or as averages across years t+ 1 and t+ 2.
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the three-digit SIC level to account for differences across industries (Hendricks & Singhal
2009, Eroglu & Hofer 2014). Since a lower value of this measure, MaxInvi,t, for facility i
and event year t indicates more efficient utilization of buffer stocks compared to industrial
peers, or leaner operations (King & Lenox 2001), for ease of interpretation, we set our
measure of leanness to be the negative of MaxInvi,t; i.e., Leannessi,t = −MaxInvi,t.
Control Variables
We employ a variety of controls to account for factors that may explain emissions reduction
efforts in response to changes in the relative assessed hazard levels of chemicals.
Market concentration: The studies by Arora & Cason (1995) and Fernndez-Kranz & Santal
(2010) found the intensity of industry competition to be associated with voluntary environ-
mental actions. To control for this potential effect, we compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl
Index (HHI) at the three-digit SIC level using Compustat data, for the year subsequent to
the event year. A higher HHI indicates a higher market concentration or lower intensity of
competition.
Industry growth: To control for industry growth or decline, we employ a measure that cap-
tures changes in total industry sales using data from Compustat. Although Compustat data
does not include information for private firms, we use the total sales of all public firms in
an industry as a proxy for total industry sales. Specifically, we calculate the ratio of total
sales of all public firms in an industry (at the three-digit SIC level) during the second year
after the event year to the total sales during the event year, take the natural logarithm of this
ratio, and multiply it by 100.
Operating scale change: The operating scale of a facility may affect its production, waste
generation, and thus, emissions. Using data from NETS, we measure changes in scale as
the ratio of facility sales during the second year after the event year to the sales during the
event year; we take the natural logarithm of this ratio and multiply it by 100.
Facility size: To control for the effect of facility size on voluntary emissions reduction ef-
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forts (e.g., Arora & Cason 1995, King & Lenox 2002), we use the natural logarithm of
the number of employees at the facility in the year subsequent to the event year. Since
the effect of facility size can be non-linear (Arora & Cason 1995), we also incorporate its
squared term.6
Operational complexity: The overall scope and complexity of a facilitys operations and en-
vironmental management efforts may have implications for the emissions reductions efforts
for individual chemicals. To account for this potential effect, we incorporate the number of
chemicals reported to the TRI by the facility in the event year as a control.
Lagged dependent variables: We incorporate lagged dependent variables to control for di-
minishing returns to environmental efforts (Beavis & Dobbs 1986, Hartl 1992). In other
words, we expect that the emissions reductions achievable during a period would be neg-
atively associated with the emissions reductions during the prior period. Since the effect
can be expected to be nonlinear, we also incorporate squared terms of the lagged dependent
variables.
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations.
2.3.3 Empirical Approach
Although we control for a variety of facility and industry-level factors that may influence
the extent of emissions reductions and the use of source reduction or EOP treatment, to
address unobserved heterogeneous characteristics among facilities and chemicals, we em-
ploy a (panel) model that includes facility-chemical fixed effects. We also incorporate time
fixed effects to account for temporal conditions. A Hausman test supported this fixed ef-
fects specification over a random effects specification (χ2 = 3054.07 with p = 0.000). In
addition, to address heteroskedasticity, we employ robust standard errors throughout our
analyses. To test for the moderating effect of operational leanness, we incorporate an in-
teraction term between change in relative assessed hazard level and operational leanness.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our empirical model for testing H1a and H2a(b) is:
ERi,c,t =β1RelHazardc,t + β2Leannessi,t + β3(RelHazardc,t × Leannessi,t)
+ λZi,c,t + αi,c + µt + εi,c,t
(2.1)
Our empirical model for testing H1b and H3a(b) is:
SRi,c,t =β1RelHazardc,t + β2Leannessi,t + β3(RelHazardc,t × Leannessi,t)
+ λZi,c,t + αi,c + µt + εi,c,t
(2.2)
Our empirical model for testing H1c and H4a(b) is:
∆EOPi,c,t =β1RelHazardc,t + β2Leannessi,t + β3(RelHazardc,t × Leannessi,t)
+ λZi,c,t + αi,c + µt + εi,c,t
(2.3)
In the models above, αi,c represents facility-chemical fixed effects, µt represents time fixed
effects, and Zi,c,t is the set of control variables.
2.4 Results
We present our main results in Table 2.2. Models 1-1 to 1-3 in Table 2.2 include only
the control variables in equations (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) above, respectively. Notably, the
coefficients of the lagged dependent variables are all significant and consistently suggest
diminishing returns to emissions reduction efforts. The effect of operational complexity is
significant and negative in Model 1-1, indicating a negative relationship between the scope
of environmental management efforts and emissions reductions for individual chemicals.
In addition, we find a U-shaped relationship between facility size and emissions reduc-
tions (including the use of source reduction); specifically, small and large-size facilities
are associated with greater emissions reductions as well as greater use of source reduction
as compared to mid-size facilities. Also, we find that facilities in industries with higher
market concentrations are associated with greater emissions reductions.
Models 2-1 to 2-3 in Table 2.2 incorporate the independent measure RelHazardc,t,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in event year t. We find that an increase in relative assessed hazard level is significantly
associated with greater emissions reductions as well as greater use of source reduction
(β1 = 4.84 with p = 0.02 when RelHazard = Increased in Model 2-1; and β1 = 3.42 with
p = 0.06 when RelHazard = Increased in Model 2-2). In other words, when the relative
assessed hazard level of a chemical increases, facilities reduce emissions by an additional
4.84% on average compared to when the relative assessed hazard level decreases. Also,
the use of source reduction increases by an average of 3.42%. However, we do not find
a significant association between an increase in relative assessed hazard level and the use
of EOP treatment (β1 = −1.08 with p = 0.73 in Model 2-3). Thus, H1a and H1b are
supported, but not H1c.
Models 3-1 to 3-3 incorporate the interaction between change in relative assessed haz-
ard level and operational leanness. From the results of Model 3-1, we observe that when the
relative assessed hazard level decreases, the coefficient of Leanness is positive and signifi-
cant (β2 = 11.88 with p = 0.03). That is, leaner facilities are associated with significantly
greater reductions in emissions than less lean facilities when the relative assessed hazard
level decreases. However, when the relative assessed hazard level increases, there is an in-
significant difference in emissions reductions between leaner and less lean facilities (when
RelHazard = Increased, β2 + β3 = 7.25 with a Wald-test p = 0.193). This suggests partial
support for a negative moderation effect of operational leanness on emissions reductions
(H2b). Figure 2.2 plots the predicted emissions reductions for leaner and less lean facilities
(including the 90% confidence intervals) depending on whether the relative assessed hazard
level increases or decreases.
The results of Model 3-2 show that, when the relative assessed hazard level decreases
or increases, the estimated coefficients of operational leanness are positive and significant
(β2 = 11.97 with p = 0.02; and β2 + β3 = 11.39 with a Wald-test p = 0.03 when
RelHazard = Increased), suggesting that the use of source reduction at leaner facilities
is greater than that at less lean facilities when the relative assessed hazard levels either
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Figure 2.2: Predicted reductions in emissions for leaner and less lean facilities when the
relative assessed hazard level increases/decrease
Notes: To illustrate the effect of operational leanness, we set the Leanness value for a leaner facility to be
one standard deviation above the mean value of Leanness (i.e., µLeanness + σLeanness) whereas we set the
value for a less lean facility to be one standard deviation below the mean value (i.e., µLeanness−σLeanness),
where σLeanness = 0.364. As a result, the distance between the lines in Figure 2.2 for leaner and less lean
facilities is β2 × 2σLeanness when the relative assessed hazard level decreases and (β2 + β3) × 2σLeanness
when the relative assessed hazard level increases.
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Figure 2.3: Predicted use of source reduction for leaner and less lean facilities when the
relative assessed hazard level increases/decrease
increase or decrease, and that operational leanness does not moderate the use of source
reduction. Thus, neither H3a nor H3b is supported. Figure 3 plots the predicted use of
source reduction. Note that the lines for leaner and less lean facilities in Figure 2.3 are
almost parallel to each other and the confidence intervals do not overlap.
The results of Model 3-3 show that, when the relative assessed hazard level decreases,
the coefficient of Leanness is negative and significant (β2 = −22.01 with p = 0.02). In
other words, when the relative assessed hazard level decreases, the use of EOP treatment
at leaner facilities decreases by a greater extent than that at less lean facilities. However,
the coefficient is insignificant when the relative assessed hazard level increases (β2 + β3 =
−7.57 with a Wald-test p = 0.41 when RelHazard = Increased). Thus, our findings suggest
partial support for a positive moderation effect of operational leanness on the use of EOP
treatment (H4a). We illustrate this finding in Figure 2.4. We also note the following overall
effects of operational leanness. The overall effect of operational leanness on emissions
reductions is positive and significant (when Leanness is added to Model 1-1, its coefficient
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Figure 2.4: Predicted changes in the use of EOP treatment for leaner and less lean facilities
when the relative assessed hazard level increases/decrease
is 9.70 with p = 0.023). Overall, operational leanness is also weakly positively associated
with source reduction (when Leanness is added to Model 1-2, its coefficient is 7.39 with
p = 0.097) and insignificantly associated with the use of EOP treatment (when Leanness is
added to Model 1-3, its coefficient is −10.94 with p = 0.117).
2.5 Robustness Checks
We examine the robustness of our main findings (i.e., support for H1a and H1b, and partial
support for H2b and H4a) to: (i) alternative measures of our main independent variable
(change in relative assessed hazard level), (ii) expansion of the set of chemicals considered
in our sample (from a focus on the top 275 to all chemicals in the SPL), and (iii) consid-
eration of additional explanatory factors. Tables of results for the robustness checks are
included in the Appendix.
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(i) Alternative measures of main independent variable (change in relative assessed haz-
ard level):
(a) As mentioned earlier, to determine the relative hazard levels of chemicals (or
their ranks), the ATSDR aggregates and publicly reports the points assigned to
chemicals based on three criteria: toxicity, frequency of occurrence at polluted
sites, and probability of human exposure based on concentration levels and types
of exposure to populations around polluted sites (ATSDR 2014). As an alter-
native to using the direction of change in rank, we calculated the ratio of the
total points received by a chemical in the event year, to the total points received
in the prior event year. Since the total points assessed for chemicals generally
increase over time as the ATSDR researches additional polluted sites, we mean-
centered this ratio across all chemicals, by event year. A positive mean-centered
ratio for a chemical indicates an above-average increase in its assessed hazard
level (PointsRatioc,t > 0). On the other hand, a negative mean-centered ra-
tio for a chemical indicates a below-average increase in its assessed hazard level
(PointsRatioc,t < 0). The results of the corresponding models with this alter-
native independent measure (reported in Appendix Table A.1.) similarly support
H1a, H1b, H2b, and H4a, as before. Additionally, we find partial support for
H3b, i.e., operational leanness negatively moderates the use of source reduction
for a chemical when the relative assessed hazard level of the chemical–measured
as PointsRatio– increases.
(b) Recall that we used a categorical measure, RelHazardc,t, in our main analysis to
capture the direction of change in the rank of a chemical in an event year. How-
ever, the numerical rank of the chemical could itself play a role in the emphasis
placed on the chemical for emissions reductions efforts (analogous to the order
effects observed by Muthulingam et al. 2013 in the adoption of energy efficiency
recommendations). In order to capture the magnitude of change in the hazard as-
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sessment of a chemical relative to its position on the SPL, we calculated the ratio
of a chemicals rank in the event year, to its rank in the prior event year. We then
took the natural logarithm of this ratio, applied a negative sign, and interacted the
resulting ratio (RankRatioc,t) with RelHazardc,t to dichotomize it according to
the direction of rank change. The results of the corresponding models with these
independent measures (reported in Appendix Table A.2) similarly support H1a,
H2b, and H4a, as before. However, we do not find support for H1b (p = 0.11),
i.e., we do not find sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that an increase
in the relative assessed hazard level of a chemical is positively associated with
the use of source reduction for the chemical.
(ii) Expansion of set of chemicals considered in the sample:
We expanded our sample to include all chemicals that appeared in the SPLs over the
period of our study, beyond the top 275 that receive significant subsequent attention.
The expanded sample contains 65,533 observations (10,623 facilities and 215 chem-
icals). Since chemicals ranked low in the SPL experience excessive rank changes
arising from only minor changes in total assessed points, we employed the alternative
independent measure PointsRatioc,t as in the robustness check i(a) above. Results
(reported in Appendix Table A3) similarly support H1a, H1b, H2b, and H4a, as be-
fore. Additionally, H3b is also partially supported.
(iii) Additional explanatory factors:
(a) Chemicals that exhibit more dramatic changes in ranks on the SPL (i.e., greater
rank variance across event years), may induce voluntary environmental actions
to a different extent than chemicals whose ranks are more stable. Using a rolling
nine-year rank history, we calculated the rank variance-to-mean ratios
(RankV artoMeanRatioc,t) for the chemicals for each event year (2003, 2005,
and 2007). We additionally interacted this variance measure with RelHazardc,t,
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to account for the potential difference in the effects of rank uncertainty when
the relative assessed hazard level increases versus when it decreases. The results
(reported in Appendix Table A4) similarly support H1a, H1b, H2b, and H4a, as
before. Furthermore, we find evidence for the increased use of EOP treatment
when the relative assessed hazard level increases for chemicals with greater rank
uncertainty.
(b) Earlier studies have suggested that local environmental preferences may influence
the voluntary environmental actions of managers. As a measure of environmental
preferences local to the state in which a facility is located, we used data from
the National Environmental Scorecard published by the League of Conservation
Voters. Similar to Doshi et al. (2013), we used the percentage of environmental
bills that were favored by members of the US House of Representatives, by state,
in the year following the event year. We mean-centered this score (LCVH) by year
and interacted it with RelHazardc,t. The results (reported in Appendix Table
A5) similarly support H1a, H1b, H2b, and H4a, as before. While this measure
of local environmental preferences is not significantly associated with emissions
reductions (similar to the results in Doshi et al. 2013), we do find evidence of
a significant and positive relationship with respect to the use of source reduction
(coefficient of LCVH in Model 2 is 0.30 with p = 0.01).
(c) Voluntary environmental actions may depend on the degree of regulatory atten-
tion or scrutiny received by an industry. To contrast the pollution damages of
industries with their net contributions to national output, Muller et al. (2011)
estimated the marginal damages of major air pollutants and factored the emitted
quantities in 2006 to derive the gross environmental damages (GEDs) of indus-
tries at the six-digit NAICS level. They then calculated the ratio of the GED of
an industry to the value added (VA) by the industry. The VA of an industry is
calculated as the market value of outputs less that of inputs, not including labor,
33
land, and capital (using data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and the
US Census Bureaus Economic Census). We recomputed the year-2006 GED/VA
values at the three-digit NAICS level and mean-centered these values. Thus, if the
ratio for an industry is positive, the industry is likely under-regulated, and if the
ratio is negative, the industry is likely over-regulated. We incorporated this addi-
tional measure, GED VA Ratio, in our model and interacted it with RelHazard.
The results (reported in Appendix Table A6) show that facilities in over-regulated
industries are associated with greater reductions in emissions as well as greater
use of source reduction when the relative assessed hazard level increases (the co-
efficient of GED VA Ratio when RelHazard = Increased is −0.48 with p = 0.02
in Model 4, and is −0.30 with p = 0.09 in Model 5). Furthermore, the results
continue to show similar support for H1a, H1b, H2b, and H4a.
2.6 Discussion
With the increasing use of chemicals and growing concerns regarding their potential haz-
ards to human health and the environment, understanding how firms respond to the dis-
semination of public information on the relative hazards of chemicals is important for re-
searchers, policymakers, environmental managers, and society as a whole. We describe the
contributions of our research below.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study in the environmental management
and sustainable operations literatures to empirically examine firms voluntary environmental
actions in response to the dissemination of public information about the relative hazards of
chemicals. We find evidence that this public information dissemination is effective, as indi-
cated by the significant association between increases in the relative assessed hazard levels
of chemicals and greater subsequent emissions reductions. Our findings therefore suggest
that facilities may recognize changes in the relative assessed hazard levels of chemicals
and internalize the associated risks by undertaking voluntary actions accordingly. In ad-
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dition, we find that in dealing with chemicals with increasing relative hazard, managers
devote greater effort to source reduction, which has also been suggested in the prior litera-
ture to be a strategically better option than EOP treatment (Hart & Ahuja 1996, Klassen &
Whybark 1999, King & Lenox 2002, Kroes et al. 2012).
With regard to the implications of operational leanness, we find that its overall effect is
positive, i.e., leaner facilities outperform less lean facilities with regard to emissions reduc-
tions. However, we find that leaner and less lean firms may respond differently in dealing
with chemicals with increasing relative hazard. In particular, when relative assessed hazard
levels increase, managers in less lean facilities increase their emissions reductions more
than managers in leaner facilities. We propose two potential explanations for this observa-
tion: first, the adoption of lean practices provides internal incentives for eliminating waste
and reducing emissions (Treville & Antonakis 2006). In the absence of such internal incen-
tives, information about the relative hazards of chemicals can help managers in less lean
facilities prioritize their environmental actions. Second, smoothed production processes
and minimized operational slacks may restrain managers in leaner facilities from achieving
further emissions reductions (and, in particular, source reductions) in response to increases
in relative assessed hazard. Consistent with this second explanation and in contrast with
the dominant view in the sustainable operations literature that lean facilities limit the use
of EOP treatment (Rothenberg et al. 2001, King & Lenox 2002), we find partial support
for a positive moderation effect of operational leanness on the use of EOP treatment when
the relative assessed hazard level increases.
For policymakers and planners designing information-based regulations and environ-
mental programs, our findings support the notion of disseminating public information to
influence firms prioritization of voluntary environmental actions. We believe that our re-
sults can be used by organizations such as ATSDR to predict the effects of informational
updates on firms reductions of chemical emissions. In addition, we show that the effective-
ness of an information dissemination program is subject to operational and demographical
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characteristics of targeted facilities (with evidence, for example, that facilities that are less
lean or that are in relatively over-regulated industries are more responsive to increases in
relative assessed hazard). Understanding the implications of these characteristics and antic-
ipating differences in responses will be particularly helpful for policymakers and planners
in designing or refining such programs.
For environmental managers, we suggest that the assertion of lean is green is robust
even after accounting for changing assessments of chemical hazards. However, we provide
new insights into the consequences of practicing lean. Managers contemplating the appli-
cation of lean practices should be cautioned against overestimating the extent of emission
reductions achievable in response to increases in relative assessed hazard levels of chem-
icals. In addition, and in contrast to the majority view in the environmental management
and sustainable operations literatures that the use of EOP treatment should be avoided in
favor of source reduction, we observe that managers in leaner facilities with limited opera-
tional slack may need to leverage EOP treatment to respond to increases in relative assessed
hazard. A more thorough understanding of these consequences is critical for assessing the
continuing environmental objectives achievable by the implementation of lean practices.
We recognize that our findings may be subject to the data sources that we use for our in-
dependent and dependent measures. First, we leverage the ranks of chemicals in the SPL as
a measure of their relative assessed hazard levels. Although hazard assessments are closely
tied to the methodologies employed, we believe that the exhaustive nature of the quan-
titative assessments by ATSDR, its federal charter to conduct public health assessments,
and its authority to assist the US EPA in determining which substances should be regu-
lated and the levels at which substances may pose a threat to human health, render the SPL
ranks of chemicals as perhaps the most credible source available for the relative hazards of
chemicals. Second, although reductions in emissions reported to the TRI have been widely
recognized and employed as a measure of voluntary environmental actions by facilities
(Hart 1995, King & Lenox 2001, Doshi et al. 2013), it is self-reported as opposed to data
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from continuous emissions monitoring systems for example. However, monitoring systems
for the 650-plus chemicals reported under the TRI program would be very challenging and
appear unlikely. Instead, we expect penalties for TRI non-compliance to continue into the
foreseeable future. Finally, while lean practices include additional principles such as the
development of employee skills and the implementation of quality management systems,
our study leverages the use of inventory buffers as a measure of leanness. Although chal-
lenging to capture for both public and private facilities from secondary data, it would be
interesting to examine the implications of other measures of leanness on the response to
changing hazard assessments.
Notwithstanding the above, our findings are quite robust to: (i) alternative measures of
our main independent variable (change in relative assessed hazard level), (ii) expansion of
the set of chemicals considered in our sample (from a focus on the top 275 to all chemi-
cals in the SPL), and (iii) consideration of additional explanatory factors. Moreover, our
study is an initial step towards understanding the effects of information dissemination in the
context of managing chemical emissions. The dissemination of information on chemical
hazards may have different implications on the use of chemicals in production processes
versus their use within products; it will be worthwhile to contrast the effects on voluntary
environmental actions in these two scenarios. In addition, other factors such as the charac-
teristics of an information dissemination program (e.g., frequency with which information
is updated), the attributes of institutions (e.g., locations of facilities and community demo-
graphics), and managers incentives and attitudes towards risk could magnify or dampen




PRODUCT WARRANTY LENGTHS AND SECONDARY MARKET
INTERFERENCE
3.1 Introduction
Product warranties are contracts that specify producers’ obligation to customers in the event
of a product not meeting its original design specifications over a defined time frame. In
addition, product warranties are prevalent and regarded as an essential product attribute
(Menezes & Currim 1992, Chu & Chintagunta 2008). The literature offers four economic
rationales for warranties that benefit a producer: protecting customers against undesirable
product defects (insurance), signaling product reliability unobservable to customers (sig-
naling), segmenting customers by their risk preference (sorting), and incentivizing the pro-
ducer to improve its products (incentive). For further detail on these rationales, please refer
to Emons (1989).
Past studies have also investigated producers’ decisions regarding their warranty lengths,
the most prominent feature in product warranties (Menezes & Currim 1992, Chu & Chin-
tagunta 2008, 2011), and have suggested that a longer warranty can compensate for cus-
tomers’ concerns regarding product reliability (Heal 1977, Chu & Chintagunta 2011, Thomas
2006). A recent study by Guajardo et al. (2016) estimates that an additional year of a war-
ranty in the US automobile market has value-added equivalent to 3.1% of the median vehi-
cle price, and finds that the value-adding effect increases when the reliability of a model is
perceived to be lower. However, our understanding regarding producers’ warranty-length
decisions is still limited. For example, while earlier studies provide mixed evidence regard-
ing the relationship between product reliability and warranty lengths, a possible non-linear
relationship have not been explored in the literature. More specifically, Kia offers war-
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ranties to cover factory-installed parts up to 5/60,000 (year/mileage) and power-train com-
ponents up to 10/100,000, compared to its more reliable competitor Nissan, which offers
3/36,000 in basic warranties and 5/60,000 in power-train warranties. In contrast, warranties
offered by Toyota are shorter in length (3/36,000 and 5/60,000 in basic and power-train)
than those offered by its more reliable sibling Lexus (4/50,000 and 6/70,000). Plotting a
scatter diagram using automobile producers’ reliability scores from J. D. Power (see detail
in section 4.3.1) and their warranty coverage in years (Figure 3.1), we observe that automo-
bile producers seem to be offering longer warranties when the reliability of their vehicles
is perceived to be either high or low.
Figure 3.1: Product reliability and warranty length
The length of basic warranties in years with the non-power-train reliability score from J. D. Power’s Vehicle
Dependability Study are indicated by black diamonds. Since the score indicates the number of problems
encountered per hundred vehicles, a lower score indicates a higher reliability. The length of power-train
warranties in years with the power-train reliability score are marked by gray squares. All data are from 2008.
Although automobiles are certainly durable products, a characteristic key to the notion
of a durable-goods market is the presence of consumer-to-consumer trading, i.e., secondary
markets, remains yet unexplored in this context. More specifically, longer product war-
ranties can help increase customers’ valuation of products, but they may also affect the
trading of used products, increase the cannibalization of new-product sales, and become
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detrimental to profit potentials. Meanwhile, the durable-goods literature suggests that pro-
ducers could mitigate the cannibalization of new products and enhance their profitability
by interfering with secondary markets through a variety of mechanisms (Hendel & Lizzeri
1999, Waldman 2004), including trade-ins or buy-back programs, that may also address
the tension between the opposing effects induced by longer warranties. Interestingly, the
automobile market has been known to practice these strategies actively (Hendel & Lizzeri
2002, Johnson & Waldman 2003, Rao et al. 2009).
Motivated by these observations in the automobile market, we question whether a pro-
ducer’s decision regarding warranty lengths is influenced by the presence of secondary
markets and by its exercise of buy-back programs. Nevertheless, the implications of longer
warranties in the presence of secondary markets and the interaction between warranty-
length decisions and secondary market interference are unexplored in the literature. There-
fore, our study takes the first step by formulating an analytical model to address these
questions.
Following traditional and established market models in the durable-goods and recent
operations management literature, our analytical model includes a profit-maximizing pro-
ducer selling a product to a market with heterogeneous customers (Hendel & Lizzeri 1997,
Huang et al. 2001, Agrawal et al. 2016, Alev et al. 2016). We incorporate product reli-
ability, an attribute that affects customers’ valuation of products and closely relates to the
cost of servicing warranties, and endogenize a producer’s decision on interfering with the
market by exercising a buy-back program. To highlight the implications of the presence
of secondary markets and the impact of the producer’s secondary market interference, we
identify the producer’s optimal warranty-length decisions in three different scenarios: (i)
without a secondary market, (ii) with a secondary market but no secondary market inter-
ference, and (iii) with secondary market interference, and examine the differences among
them. The results show that the presence of secondary markets complicates the conditions
under which the producer benefits from offering longer warranties: in the presence of sec-
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ondary markets, the value of longer warranties is non-monotonic. We also find that the
producer’s secondary market interference further influences the conditions under which of-
fering longer warranties is more profitable. Essentially, offering longer warranties can ben-
efit two types of producers: as conventional wisdom has suggested, a producer observing
low reliability in its products can leverage longer warranties to increase its profits. How-
ever, when interfering with a secondary market through exercising a buy-back program, a
producer of reliable products may also benefit from longer warranties.
Our work provides several contributions to the literature. First, to our best knowl-
edge, this study is the first to examine the implications of durable-goods warranty lengths
in the presence of secondary markets. In particular, we highlight the trade-off between
the increase in customers’ product valuation and used-product cannibalization induced by
a longer warranty. Second, we are also the first to explore the joint effect of produc-
ers’ warranty-length decisions and their secondary market interference and reveal that the
engagement in secondary market interference significantly changes the conditions under
which offering longer warranties is more profitable. Third and most importantly, supported
by our empirical findings in the next chapter, we offer a compelling explanation to durable-
goods producers’ decisions on the length of product warranties with respect to product
reliability. For durable-goods producers, we highlight that the decisions regarding product
warranty lengths are subtle because of the presence of secondary markets, and those mak-
ing such decisions should also contemplate the decision of secondary market interference
as well.
3.2 Literature Review
With a focus on a durable-goods producer’s decision regarding the length of its product
warranties and whether to interfere with the secondary market, we extensively reviewed
two closely-related streams of research. The first is about the motives of warranties and
their implications. The second is related to the durable-goods literature, focusing on the
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implications of the presence of secondary markets and producers’ secondary market inter-
ference.
A large number of economics and marketing studies have examined the four economic
rationales for offering product warranties: (i) an insurance effect, (ii) a signaling effect, (iii)
an incentive mechanism, and (iv) a sorting mechanism. The insurance effect of warranties
is about transferring potential loss caused by product breakdowns from customers back
to producers (Heal 1977). The signaling effect suggests that warranties convey product
reliability information unobservable to customers (Spence 1977, Kirmani & Rao 2000).
The incentive stream regards warranties as a mechanism to incentivize producers to reveal
and improve product reliability (Priest 1981, Cooper & Ross 1985). The sorting stream
posits warranties as a marketing tool to segregate customers by their risk preference (Kubo
1986). Most of these studies emphasize market inefficiency (e.g., information asymmetry)
and customer characteristics (e.g., heterogeneity in risk aversion). For a comprehensive
review of these effects, please see Emons (1989) and Lutz (1996).
Empirical studies examining these warranty effects and their impact are few. Focusing
on customers’ valuation, Chu & Chintagunta (2008, 2011) examine these effects in the US
automobile and personal computer markets and only find support to the insurance effect
and the sorting effect, while providing some evidence that the failure rate of products and
their warranty lengths are positively correlated. More recently, focusing on the US auto-
mobile market, Guajardo et al. (2016) regard warranty lengths as a service attribute and
examine the relationships between warranty lengths, service quality, and product quality.
They find that warranty lengths and service quality are complementary, and both compen-
sate for product quality. That is, the value of a longer warranty is greater for a lower-quality
product, which also supports the insurance effect.
Regarding producers’ decisions on warranty lengths and their relationship with product
reliability, Menezes & Currim (1992) propose an analytical model for the optimal product
price and warranty length and suggest a negative relationship between product reliability
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and warranty length. However, they do not test the relationship. Instead, the authors as-
sume that product prices and warranty lengths are exogenous, and empirically test their
associations with sales. On the other hand, relying on the signaling stream of the warranty
literature, several empirical studies examine the relationship between product reliability
and warranty length and obtain mixed findings. Gerner & Bryant (1981) first find that
warranties within a product category (e.g., TV, refrigerators, clothes dryers, and air con-
ditioners) are highly standardized, and Priest (1981) find no connection between product
life and warranty length. Both indicate that the link between product reliability and war-
ranty length is insignificant. Using reliability measures from Consumer Reports, Wiener
(1985) and Kelley (1988) each find a positive association between warranty length and
product reliability in the appliance and automobile markets. Nevertheless, using a similar
reliability measure from Consumer Reports, Douglas et al. (1993) find a negative asso-
ciation between warranty length and product reliability in the automobile market. They
also find that the relationship becomes positive when they incorporate dealers’ surcharges,
which suggests that other factors may play a significant role in the relationship. Moreover,
Agrawal & Richardson (1996) find no significant relationship after examining a range of
electronic products and household appliances, and suggest exploring additional factors that
may influence the relationship.
Our research thus attempts to fill the above gap by examining factors that have not
been explored. That is, we examine the relationship with a focus on the two prominent
characteristics observed in the automobile market: (i) the presence of secondary markets, a
key notion of a durable-goods market, and (ii) producers’ engagement in secondary market
interference. In addition, we emphasize the insurance effect of warranties in the presence
of secondary markets, and contribute to the literature by revealing additional implications
of the effect.
The durable-goods literature has extensively examined the implications of the exis-
tence of secondary markets on producers’ profitability. Since durable products could last
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a long time, they observe secondary markets. The resale value of used products in the
secondary market positively affects the price of new products (Waldman 2003), but the
availability of used products may substitute for demand for new products, which canni-
balizes new-product sales and negatively contributes to producers’ profits (Agrawal et al.
2016). Other studies in the stream have further suggested that producers may use strategies
such as decreasing the availability of used products via planned obsolescence (Waldman
2003, Agrawal et al. 2016), buy-backs or trade-ins (Fudenberg & Tirole 1998, Rao et al.
2009), improving the value of used products through licensing or recertification programs
(Oraiopoulos et al. 2012, Huang et al. 2016), or eliminating secondary market competi-
tion through leasing (Waldman 1997, Hendel & Lizzeri 1999). The underlying mechanism
of these strategies is to influence the resale value of used products, hence adjusting the
balance between the positive (resale value) effect and the negative (cannibalization) effect
exerted by secondary markets (Oraiopoulos et al. 2012). Nevertheless, our understanding
of the effect of warranties via the two opposing secondary market effects and the impact
of secondary market interference, such as the popular trade-in/buy-back programs in the
automobile market, is limited.
To the best of our knowledge, Utaka (2006) is one study that examines durable-goods
producers’ warranty decisions in the presence of a secondary market. Based on the signal-
ing stream and using a three-period model, the study focuses on a monopolistic producer’s
moral-hazard problem and examines the implications of the producer’s warranty decision
(i.e., whether to offer warranties or repair services) on its product durability level and over-
all social welfare. The study endogenizes the value of used products but assumes exogenous
demand for new products, which captures the positive secondary market effect but neglects
the negative one. The author suggests that warranties can alleviate the moral-hazard prob-
lem and improve social welfare under an asymmetric information setting.
By revealing the non-monotonic benefit of offering longer warranties, we contribute to
this stream of literature by highlighting the implications of the secondary market effects
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on a producer’s warranty-length decision, a common but underexplored business decision
for a durable-goods producer, as well as the impact of the producer’s secondary market
interference.
3.3 The Model
Focusing on a producer’s decision regarding the warranty length of a product and the ex-
ercise of a buy-back program, we adopt the durable-goods model from Alev et al. (2016).
This model is a discrete-time, infinite-horizon, and sequential game in which a profit-
maximizing monopolistic producer produces a durable product and interferes with the sec-
ondary market through a buy-back program. In the following sections, we first describe the
assumptions regarding the product, the customers, and the producer. We then outline the
specification of the game.
3.3.1 The Product
We consider a durable product that has a two-period life span (Desai & Purohit 1998,
Huang et al. 2001, Hendel & Lizzeri 1997, Agrawal et al. 2016) and depreciates with
use. If the product has never been used, it is new and has a useful life of two periods. A
used product has only one period of life remaining, and a depreciated value relates to a new
product. A product after two-period use is referred to as end-of-life, and has no residual
value. To indicate the characteristics relating to a new product and a used product, we
introduce subscripts n and u, respectively. In addition, we assume the product is reliable,
i.e., operating as its design specifies, to an extent. Motivated by market reliability indexes
like the reliability score of J. D. Power’s Vehicle Dependability Study, which measures the
number of reliability related problems encountered by customers, we define fn and fu as the
number of problems of a product during its first and second periods of use, and normalize
them by the maximum number of problems (e.g., the number of components/features) such
that fn ∈ (0, 1) and fu ∈ (0, 1). As such, 1− fn represents the new-product reliability (the
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extent of a new product meeting its original specifications), and 1− fu is the used-product
reliability.
3.3.2 Customers
We assume that customers’ valuation of a fully functional new product, θ, is heterogeneous
and uniformly distributed in a market. In addition, we assume that the size of the market
is one and stays constant. Thus, θ is U [0, 1]. As mentioned, customers have concerns
regarding the reliability of products, and perceive a value depreciation on used products
as δ ∈ (0, 1). As a result, a type θ customer perceives the value of using a new product
as (1 − fn)θ per period and the value of using a used product as (1 − fu)δθ per period.
The valuation of products reflects that consumers value the use of a new product more than
the use of a used product in general1, and the difference in valuation depends on product
depreciation and reliability.
In this model, customers possess no more than one product in each time period. There-
fore, at the beginning of a period, a customer can either buy a new product, buy a used
product, keep their current product if it was new in the previous period, or stay inactive.
In addition, if a secondary market exists, a customer who possesses a product with one
period of useful life remaining may choose to sell the used product. Lastly, customers are
forward-looking and have a value discount ρ per period.
3.3.3 The Producer
We assume that the producer is the only company that produces the product and offers
warranties to customers. The producer chooses to offer product warranties in two different
lengths, short (S) or long (L). Short warranties protect customers from reliability problems
that may occur during the first period of product life, and long warranties protect customer
for both periods of product life. Because both short and long warranties cover the first
1We assume fn ≤ fu. That is, the reliability of new products equals or is better than that of used products
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period of product life, the producer insures new-product customers from product break-
downs. Therefore, a type θ customer’s valuation of using a new product increases from
(1− fn)θ to θ. If the producer offers short warranties and provides no coverage to its used
products, a type θ customer still values a used product at (1− fu)δθ. That is, offering short
warranties increases customers’ valuation of new products but not that of used products.
In contrast, if the producer offers long warranties, a type θ customer’s valuation of a used
product increases to δθ. Nevertheless, the producer incurs an additional cost of servicing
long warranties.
Assuming that the cost of administering warranties is negligible and that the cost of
servicing a warranty increases with the number of reliability problems by a cost factor
Cw, we have the warranty costs of a new product and a used product as fnCw and fuCw,
respectively. The warranty cost factor, Cw, represents the total cost of addressing possible
reliability problems of a product. In addition, for ease in exposition, we denote the cost of
producing a product (Cn) and servicing it in the first period (fnCw) as a baseline cost C,
i.e., C = Cn + fnCw, and refer to the additional cost of servicing a used product as fuCw
when the producer chooses to offer long warranties.
We indicate time periods by t and use superscripts S and L to indicate variables when
the producer offers short or long warranties. In a time period t, the producer prices a new
product at P Sn
t if it offers short warranties or PLn
t if it offers long warranties. In addition,
if a secondary market exists, the producer may interfere with the secondary market by
exercising a buy-back program. That is, the producer purchases some used products from
the secondary market. We denote the quantities of buy-backs as QSu
t and QLu
t and refer to
the prices of used products in the market as P Su
t and PLu
t.
3.3.4 Specification of the Game
As mentioned, the game is a discrete-time, infinite-horizon, and sequential game. The
producer makes the warranty-length decision, i.e., choosing a warranty length between
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short (S) or long (L), at the start of the game (t = 0). In each ensuing period t > 0, the
producer makes the pricing decision, i.e., setting the price of new products in the chosen
warranty length. If a secondary market exists, the producer also decides whether to interfere
with the secondary market, i.e., determining the quantity of used products to buy back
from the secondary market. After that, customers choose their actions to maximize their
net present value. In addition, all information is common knowledge in this game and we
solve the game by using backward induction.
3.4 Benchmark: No Secondary Market
While secondary markets exist for many durable products, they may be restrained by certain
factors such as the lack of customer-to-customer trading infrastructure, substantial transac-
tion costs, and regulatory restrictions. To better understand the impact of the presence of
secondary markets, we examine a benchmark scenario in which no secondary market exists.
We first characterize the demand for new products and represent the producer’s problem.
We then analyze the equilibria depending on the producer’s warranty-length decision, and
explore the producer’s optimal warranty length.
3.4.1 Customer Strategies and Demand Functions
Because product life is two periods, we focus on two-period customer strategies. If the
producer offers short warranties, the three two-period customer strategies are: (i) buying
a new product and discarding it after one-period of use every period (NSNS); (ii) buying
a new product and keeping the out-of-warranty used product (NSKS); and (iii) staying
inactive always (II). Focusing on the stationary equilibrium of the game (Huang et al.
2001, Agrawal et al. 2016, Alev et al. 2016), we eliminate the time index in our nota-
tions, i.e., P Sn
t




















1+ρ(1−fu)δ such that cus-
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tomers with θ ∈ (θS1 , 1] prefer strategy NSNS , customers with θ ∈ (θS2 , θS1 ] prefer strategy
NSKS , and customers with θ ∈ [0, θS2 ] choose to be inactive. We then can express the de-
mand function of new products with short warranties asQSn(P
S
n ) = 1−θS1 + 12(θ
S
1 −θS2 ) and





(θS1 − θS2 ).
If the producer offers long warranties, we identify the stationary equilibrium by set-
ting fu = 0 in the customer utility. More specifically, the net present values of cus-














> 0 still, and the thresholds of these customer strate-







, the demand for new products with long warranties
is QLn(P
L
n ) = 1 − θL1 + 12(θ
L
1 − θL2 ) and the quantity of used products remaining in the





(θL1 − θL2 ).
3.4.2 Producer’s Problem
Under stationarity, we denote the per-period steady state profit of the producer offering
short warranties as ΠS and reduce the profit-maximizing producer’s problem to the steady-





n − C). If the producer offers long war-
ranties, it incurs the additional cost of servicing long warranties, QLk (P
L
n )fuCw. Therefore,





n − C)−QLk (PLn )fuCw.
3.4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
We first note the price thresholds that influence market segmentation outcomes.
Lemma 3.1 In the absence of the secondary market, a threshold in product price exists
(i.e., 1−(1−fu)δ if the producer offers short warranties, or 1−δ if the producer offers long
warranties) such that a portion of customers discard their used products if the producer
prices new products below the threshold.
When the producer offers short warranties, we note that strategy NSNS is active only if
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θS1 < 1 (when the producer offers long warranties, N
LNL is active only if θL1 < 1). That
is, if the price of a new product is sufficiently low, customers with higher product valuation
(higher θ) may value the difference between a new product and a used product more than
the price of a new product, resulting in the purchase of a new product and the discarding of a
used product every period. We incorporate this threshold and solve the producer’s problem
by the Karush Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) approach if the producer offers short warranties, as well
as if the producer offers long warranties.
Proposition 3.1 In the absence of the secondary market, a threshold, C̃Sb (δ, fu)(C̃Lb (δ, fu, Cw)),
exists such that the producer offering short (long) warranties adopts a different pricing


















when C < C̃Lb ).
When the producer’s baseline cost C is low, the producer can price new products below
the price thresholds in Lemma 3.1 and, therefore, a portion of customers discard their used
products. More interestingly, the pricing policies below the baseline cost thresholds in-
dicates that the producer may drop the new-product price substantially at the thresholds
( (1+δ)δ(1−fu)
2
at C̃Sb if the producer offers short warranties and
(1+δ)(δ+fuCw)
2
at C̃Lb if the
producer offers long warranties). The reason for this is that customers’ choice between
purchasing a new product (and discarding a used product) every period or keeping a used
product represents the competition between new and used products (i.e., potential canni-
balization of new-product sales) and the producer prefers customers discarding their used
products. As a result, when the producer can price new products low and lead customers
to discard their used products, the producer may lower the price further to motivate more
customers to discard their used products and reduce the cannibalization of new products at
a greater extent.
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3.4.4 Warranty Length Decision
We next explore the producer’s warranty-length decision when the secondary market is
absent. We compare the optimal profit if the producer offers short warranties and that if it
offers long warranties to determine the producer’s optimal warranty-length decision. We
summarize our findings in Corollary 3.1.
Corollary 3.1 Let C ≥ max(C̃Sb , C̃Lb ) and Cw < δ. At most one threshold, f ′B, exists such
that offering long warranties is more profitable when f ′B < fu.
Defining the profit margin of a new product if the producer offers short warranties as P Sb
∗−
C, and that if the producer offers long warranties as PLb
∗ − C − fuCw, a higher baseline
cost C of a product implies a lower profit margin. When C ≥ max(C̃Sb , C̃Lb ), low profit
margins prohibit the producer from lowing new-product prices and motivating customers to
discard their used products. Thus, all customers keep used products. Notably, the difference
between the profit margin of offering short warranties and that of offering long warranties
is fu(δ − Cw), and the condition Cw < δ implies that the additional cost of offering a long
warranty is less than the increase in the used-product valuation it contributes. In addition,
the difference increases linearly in fu, indicating that the increase in the profit margin
gained by offering long warranties becomes greater when the reliability of used products is
lower. As such, when used-product reliability is low, offering long warranties increases the
profit margin sufficiently, offsets the decrease in demand for new products induced by the
increase in new-product price, and results in greater profits than offering short warranties.
Figure 3.2 illustrates an example in which offering long warranties is more profitable when
fu > f
′
B. The finding indicates that the value-added by offering long warranties is the
preeminent factor in the warranty-length decision.2
2When C ≤ min(C̃Sb , C̃Lb ), offering long warranties is always sub-optimal even if it is costless to do so,
Cw = 0. This is because when producers can price their new products to have a portion of customers discard
used products, producers may further lower the price to reduce the cannibalization of new products. As such,
producers naturally prefer having used products valued less by offering short warranties.
51
Figure 3.2: Profit difference when the secondary market is absent
δ = 0.6, C = 1.05, and Cw = 0.55. The bold line, ∆B , represents the difference between the optimal profit
if the producer offers short warranties and that if it offers long warranties. ∆B is positive when offering long
warranties is more profitable.
Proofs are shown in Appendix B.1. Corollary 3.1 reflects the conventional wisdom that
durable-goods producers benefit from offering longer warranties when the reliability of
their products is a concern. Nevertheless, this finding falls short of explaining the observed
relationship between automobile producers’ warranty lengths and their reliability scores.
We next examine the implications of the presence of a secondary market.
3.5 Presence of a Secondary Market
Using an approach similar to that in the previous section, we characterize the demand for
new products and represent the producer’s problem in the presence of a secondary market.
We first identify the equilibrium by the producer’s warranty-length decision and investigate
the implications of the used product reliability on these equilibria. We then examine the
producer’s warranty-length decision when it does not interfere with the secondary market.
After that, we explore the impact of secondary market interference on the decision.
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3.5.1 Customer Strategies
We assume that a secondary market exists and that transaction costs in the market are negli-
gible. Following the intuitive argument in Hendel & Lizzeri (1997) that keeping a product is
equivalent to selling a product and buying it back immediately, we reduce customer actions
at the beginning of each period to: buying a new product with a short warranty and selling
it to the secondary market after one-period use, buying an out-of-warranty used product,
or staying inactive. As a result, if the producer offers short warranties, the three customer
strategies that are un-dominated and could be active are: buying a new product with a
short warranty every period (NSNS); buying an out-of-warranty used product every period
(USUS); and staying inactive always (II). The net present values of these customer strate-









1−ρ ; and Vθ[II] = 0, respectively.











(1−fu)δ such that customers with θ ∈ (θ
S
1 , 1] prefer strategy N
SNS , customers with
θ ∈ (θS2 , θS1 ] prefer strategy USUS , and customers with θ ∈ [0, θS2 ] choose to be inactive.
If the producer offers long warranties, the three customer strategies that could be ac-
tive are: buying a new product with a long warranty (NLNL); buying an in-warranty used
product every period (ULUL); and staying inactive always (II). We also identify the sta-
tionary equilibrium by eliminating fu. That is, the net present values of these customer























3.5.2 Demand Functions and Market-clearing Prices





1 − θS1 . These customers sell their products in the secondary market after one-period use.
Meanwhile, the producer may purchase some used products back from the secondary mar-
ket through a buy-back program. Assuming that used products are traded in the secondary
market at a market-clearing price, which implies that the supply of used products equals
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1 −θS2 +QSu . By solving these equations simultaneously, we






1+(1+2ρ)(1−fu)δ . We also can derive the market clearing price of used products







Both functions increase in QSu , which implies that buying back used products improves the
resale value of new products (Alev et al. 2016) and increases the demand for new products.




u) = 1−θL1 andQLn(PLn , QLu)−
QLu = θ
L















. Both functions also increase in QLu . In addition, the demand functions
under both warranty lengths, as well as the used-product prices, become the same if fu = 0.
3.5.3 Producer’s Problem
In the presence of the secondary market, the producer also determines the quantity of used
products to buy back at the beginning of every period. If the producer offers short war-








n−C)−QSuP Su (P Sn , QSu) s.t. QSn(P Sn , QSu) ≥ QSu ≥ 0, whereQSuP Su (P Sn , QSu)




u) ≥ QSu ensures
that the producer does not buy back more used products than they produce. If the pro-













u) − QLu)fCw is the additional cost of servicing longer warranties on products
that remain in the market.
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3.5.4 Equilibrium Analysis
We also solve the producer’s problems by the Karush Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) approach and
highlight the conditions under which the producer interferes with the secondary market in
Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2 If the producer offers short warranties, the producer exercises a buy-back
program (QSu
∗
> 0) when 2C + (1 − fu)δ ≤ 1. If the producer offers long warranties,
the producer exercises a buy-back program (QLu
∗
> 0) when 2C + δ ≤ 1 + 1+δ
δ
fuCw. In
addition, if the producer offers long warranties and Cδ ≤ Cwfu, the producer shuts down








Proof of Proposition 3.2: see Appendix B.2. 
If the producer offers short warranties, it is not responsible for the reliability issues of
used products. Therefore, the condition of exercising a buy-back program is independent
of the warranty cost factor Cw. Notably, for a perfectly reliable used product (fu = 0),
the condition of the partial buy-back policy is the same as that in Lemma 1 of Alev et al.
(2016), which suggests that durable-goods producers may interfere with the secondary
market by exercising a buy-back program when the profit margin or the depreciation of
their products is high. We can also infer that because the decrease in used-product valuation
makes buying back programs more affordable, producers are more likely to exercise a buy-
back program when they observe lower used-product reliability.
We refer to the solution in which buying back used products from the secondary market
is suboptimal as the “no buy-back policy (QSu
∗
= 0 or QLu
∗
= 0)” and the solution in
which the producer may buy back some used products as the “partial buy-back policy
(QSu
∗
> 0 or QLu
∗
> 0)”. As also found in Alev et al. (2016), a policy under which the









> 0, is always suboptimal if the producer offers short warranties.
If the producer can offer long warranties at no cost (Cw = 0), the condition of the
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partial buy-back policy also becomes the same as that in Lemma 1 of Alev et al. (2016).
This condition also implies that producers are more likely to exercise a buy-back program
if the additional cost of servicing its long warranty (Cwfu) is higher. That is, if a producer
offers long warranties, buying back used products also reduces its obligation to service
in-warranty used products.









> 0)” is viable. The condition of this policy indicates that if the profit margin of the
product is high, if the depreciation of the product is high, or if the additional warranty cost
is substantial, shutting down the secondary market completely is optimal. The finding also
suggests that because of the additional savings from reducing the number of in-warranty
used products in the market, durable-goods producers may shutdown the secondary market
if they offer long warranties.
To better understand the implications of the presence of the secondary market and
the producer’s secondary market interference and to shed light on the factors that influ-
ence the warranty-length decision, we further examine these equilibria with respect to
used-product reliability. For ease of exposition, we define buy-back policy thresholds in
used-product reliability as fNN = min[2C−1+δδ ,
δ(2C−1+δ)
(1+δ)Cw






such that the no buy-back policy is optimal when fu < fNN regardless of the pro-
ducer’s warranty-length decision, that the partial buy-back policy is always optimal when
fPP < fu < fL, and that if the producer offers long warranties, the full buy-back policy
is optimal when fu > fL. If the used-product reliability is sufficiently low (fu > fNN ),
durable-goods producers may find interfering with the secondary market is more profitable.
In addition, we note that fPP < 0 when 2C+δ < 1, indicating that the producer may inter-
fere with the secondary market when the profit margin and the depreciation of the product
are sufficiently high, regardless of the warranty-length decision. We then summarize our
findings in Corollary 3.2.
Corollary 3.2 P Sn
∗ and PLn
∗ are the same as that in the no secondary market scenario
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when customers keep used products. They are also consistent under the no buy-back policy
and the partial buy-back policy.
Let fNN < 1, i.e., a buy-back policy is optimal when used-product reliability is suffi-











, 0) is decreasing linearly in fu.
















) are both increasing linearly in fu.
The optimal pricing policies, depending on the producer’s warranty-length decision, are
identical to those when the secondary market is absent and customers keep used products.
They are also consistent under the no buy-back policy and the partial buy-back policy.
Therefore, as noted in the no secondary market scenario, the value-added by offering long
warranties increase linearly as the reliability of used products decreases.
Regarding the optimal production and buy-back quantities, we focus on the condition
fNN < 1 under which interfering with the secondary market is more profitable when the
used-product reliability is low.3 When the no buy-back policy is optimal and if the producer
offers short warranties (i), a decrease in used-product reliability reduces the new-product
price and decreases the cannibalization of new products. Both increase demand for new
products. If the producer offers long warranties (ii), customers’ valuation of products is
ensured and the producer demands a higher price when it observes lower used-product re-
liability, resulting in less demand for new products. When exercising a buy-back program
is optimal, a decrease in used-product reliability leads to a greater extent of buy-back ac-
tivities. If the producer offers short warranties (iii), a decrease in used-product reliability
3When fNN > 1, i.e., the no buy-back policy is always optimal regardless of the producer’s warranty
length decision, the optimal warranty-length decision is also a threshold policy similar to that when the
secondary market is absent and all customers keep used products (detail available upon request).
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decreases used-product valuation, and the producer can afford to buy more used products.
Nevertheless, as a decrease in used-product reliability also reduces the cannibalization of
new products, it limits the efficacy of the buy-back program. As a result, if the producer
observes lower used-product reliability, it increases buy-back activities but at a lesser rate.
If the producer offers long warranties (iv), the warranty coverage of used products protects
the value of used products and ensures the efficacy of the buy-back program. Neverthe-
less, in this context, producers may completely remove used products from the secondary
market if their used-product reliability is sufficiently low.
Figure 3.3: The optimal production and buy-back quantities
δ = 0.6, C = 0.3, and Cw = 0.2. The solid bold line represents the optimal production quantities when the
producer offers short warranties QSn
∗ and the dashed bold line is the corresponding optimal buy-back quan-
tities QSu
∗. The solid thin line is the optimal production quantities when the producer offers long warranties
QLn
∗ and the dashed thin line is the corresponding optimal buy-back quantity QLu
∗.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the findings in Corollary 3.2 and the positions of these buy-back
policy thresholds. In the region between fNN and fPP , different buy-back policies are
optimal depending on the producer’s warranty-length decision. In addition, the region
where fu > fL indicates that the producer may shut down the secondary market if it offers
long warranties.
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3.5.5 Warranty Length Decision
We first explore a scenario in which the no buy-back policy is optimal regardless of the
producer’s warranty-length decision, and examine the optimal warranty length decision by
comparing the optimal profit if the producer offers short warranties and that if it offers long
warranties. We summarize our findings in Corollary 3.3.
Corollary 3.3 Let fu < fNN , i.e., the buy-back policies are sub-optimal, and Cw < δ. At
most two thresholds, f ′NN&f
′′
NN , exist such that offering long warranties is more profitable
when f ′NN < fu < f
′′
NN .
Proof of Corollary 3.3: see Appendix B.3. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates an example in which both thresholds exist. The finding suggests that
durable-goods producers are more likely to offer longer warranties when their used-product
reliability is in the middle (f ′NN < fu < f
′′
NN and region II in Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Profit difference when the no buy-back policy is optimal
δ = 0.55, C = 0.435, and Cw = 0.205. The bold line, ∆NN , represents the difference between the optimal
profit if the producer offers short warranties and that if it offers long warranties under the no buy-back policy.
∆NN is positive when offering long warranties is more profitable.
Because the value-added by offering long warranties is greater when the reliability
of used products is lower, the condition fu < f ′NN indicates that when used products
59
are sufficiently reliable, the increase in the profit margin by offering long warranties is
insufficient to offset the decrease in demand for new products induced. In contrast, fu >
f ′NN indicates that when the used products are less reliable, the increase in the profit margin
by offering long warranties becomes sufficient. The rationale for threshold f ′NN is similar
to that for threshold f ′B (and Region I & II in Figure 3.2) in the benchmark scenario. More
specifically, in this context, the value-added by offering long warranties via the resale value
effect is the predominant factor in the warranty-length decision.
Threshold f ′′NN highlights the difference in the warranty-length decision because of the
presence of a secondary market. As noted by comparing Corollary 3.2 (i) to (ii), the differ-
ence between the optimal production quantity if the producer offers short warranties and
that if the producer offers long warranties is increasing and convex in fu. That is, as the re-
liability of used products gets lower, offering long warranties increases the cannibalization
of the new-product market at a greater rate. Therefore, the condition fu > f ′′NN (and Region
III in Figure 3.4) indicates that when used products are unreliable, offering long warranties
induces substantial cannibalization of new products. The producer is more profitable by
offering short warranties to protect its new-product market. In other words, the cannibal-
ization effect induced by the added value of long warranties becomes the preeminent factor
in the warranty-length decision.
Corollary 3.3 shows that the value-added by offering long warranties influences the
balance between the secondary market effects (i.e., the positive resale-value effect and
the negative cannibalization effect), resulting in the observed non-monotonic benefit of
offering long warranties. Durable-goods producers that do not engage in secondary market
interference are more likely to offer long warranties when their used products are less
reliable, but they reverse the decision when their used products are unreliable. In addition,
this finding indicates that the producer’s warranty-length decision is more sensitive and
flexible than the decision to interfere with the secondary market. That is, when durable-
goods producers are concerned about the used-product cannibalization, although they may
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not yet be able to exercise a buy-back program to mitigate the concern (e.g., because of an
insufficient profit margin), they may nonetheless change their warranty lengths.
We next examine a scenario in which buying back used products is optimal regardless
of the producer’s warranty-length decision,4 and explore the impact of the producer’s sec-
ondary market interference on its warranty-length decision. We summarize the optimal
decision of the producer’s warranty length in Corollary 3.4.
Corollary 3.4 Let fPP < fu < fL, i.e., the partial buy-back policy is optimal, and fL >
1. At most two thresholds, f ′PP&f
′′
PP , exist such that offering long warranties is more
profitable when fu < f ′PP or when fu > f
′′
PP .
Proof of Corollary 3.4: see Appendix B.5. 
We focus on the condition that the full buy-back policy is never optimal even if the producer
offers long warranties, i.e., fL > 1. Figure 3.5 illustrates an example in which both thresh-
olds exist under these conditions. Different from Corollary 3.3 in the previous scenario,
Corollary 3.4 suggests that when durable-goods producers engage in secondary market in-
terference and never shut down the secondary market, they are more likely to offer longer
warranties when their used-product reliability is near an extreme, i.e., either low or high
(fu < f ′PP or fu > f
′′
PP , and region I & III in Figure 3.4).
The condition, fPP < 1 and fL > 1, implies that Cw < δ2 , which is more stringent
than the condition of having positive value-added by offering long warranties, Cw < δ. A
smaller warranty cost factor indicates a more substantial added value of long warranties,
resulting in the greater profitability of offering long warranties when fu < f ′PP (region I in
Figure 3.5). Nevertheless, offering long warranties becomes less profitable when fu > f ′PP ,
and the rationales for the threshold (and Region II in Figure 3.5) are twofold: the secondary
market cannibalization and the limited efficacy of a buy-back program. The cannibalization
4We note that under conditions where the full buy-back policy is optimal when the producer offers long
warranties, the producer is more profitable by offering short warranties. See Appendix B.4. Therefore, we
focus on the condition where the partial buy-back policy is optimal, regardless of the producer’s warranty-
length decision
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Figure 3.5: The profit difference when the partial buy-back policy is optimal
δ = 0.40, C = 0.309, and Cw = 0.098, which implies fL > 1. The bold line, ∆PP , represents the difference
between the optimal profit if the producer offers short warranties and that if it offers long warranties under
the partial buy-back policy. ∆PP is positive if offering long warranties is more profitable.
of new-product market increases at a greater rate as the used-product reliability gets lower,
which is the same rationale for threshold f ′′NN (and region II & III in Figure 3.4) in the
previous scenario. Meanwhile, as mentioned in Corollary 3.2 (iii) and (iv), because offering
long warranties increases used-product valuation and makes the buy-back program more
costly, the producer can afford to buy back fewer used products from the market and reduce
the used-product cannibalization at a lesser extent. Therefore, offering long warranties may
become less profitable when used products are less reliable, and the cannibalization effect
of the secondary market and the efficacy of secondary market interference are the two
preeminent factors.
The rationales for threshold f ′′PP (and Region III in Figure 3.5) are likewise twofold: the
improved efficacy of the buy-back program and the additional cost savings. As mentioned
in Corollary 3.2 (iii) and (iv), if the producer offers short warranties, leveraging a buy-back
program to address the used-product cannibalization becomes less effective as the used-
product reliability decreases. The efficacy of the buy-back program remains consistent if
the producer offers long warranties. As a result, when the producer’s used-product relia-
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bility is sufficiently low, the buy-back program may become more effective if the producer
offers long warranties than if the producer offers short warranties. Meanwhile, as noted
from the condition of the partial buy-back policy if the producer offers long warranties in
Proposition 3.2, offering long warranties and interfering with the secondary market jointly
generates additional cost savings because a buy-back program removes in-warranty prod-
ucts from the market. As such, offering long warranties may become more profitable when
used products are unreliable, and the efficacy of secondary market interference and the
warranty-cost savings are the leading factors.
We further note that under the condition of fL < 1 (e.g., the warranty cost factor is not
small, or the product depreciation is high), f ′′PP always > 1. As a result, the producer’s
warranty-length decision is a threshold policy, and offering long warranties is more profit
only if fu < f ′PP . This finding suggests that if a producer were to offer long warranties and
shut down the secondary market when its used products are unreliable, the producer may
offer long warranties only if its used products are sufficiently reliable .
Compared to the findings of Corollary 3.3 about durable-goods producers not inter-
fering with the secondary market, the findings of Corollary 3.4 reveals several important
insights regarding producers engaging in secondary market interference. First, when pro-
ducers may be more profitable by engaging in secondary market interference, the added
value of longer warranties is substantial, and they are more likely to offer long warranties.
Nevertheless, the efficacy of producers’ buy-back programs influence their warranty-length
decision. Also, buy-back programs generate additional warranty-cost savings if producers
offer long warranties. The interaction of these effects results in the non-monotonic benefit
of offering long warranties. Second, producers’ secondary market interference dramatically
changes the conditions under which offering longer warranties is more profitable. More
specifically, when producers do not interfere with the secondary market, offering longer
warranties may be more profitable when the reliability of their used products is neither too
high nor too low (i.e., less reliable but not unreliable). When producers actively engage in
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secondary market interference, offering longer warranties becomes more profitable when
the reliability of their used products is either high or low (i.e., sufficiently reliable or un-
reliable). Third and most importantly, the findings offer a compelling explanation of our
observations in the automobile market.
3.6 Conclusions
Many, if not all, durable goods come with product warranties. Nevertheless, our under-
standing of producers’ decisions on their product warranty lengths, particularly on their
relationship with product reliability, remains limited. In addition, while secondary mar-
kets exist for most durable products, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to
examine producers’ warranty-length decisions with respect to the reliability of their used
products in the presence of secondary markets.
By analytically examining a durable-goods producer’s optimal warranty-length deci-
sion in three different scenarios: (i) without a secondary market, (ii) with a secondary mar-
ket but no secondary market interference, and (iii) with secondary market interference, we
identify the implications of the presence of the secondary market and the impact of the pro-
ducer’s secondary market interference on its warranty-length decision. We first find that the
value-added by longer warranties (via the resale-value effect when the secondary market
presents) is consistent in all three scenarios. That is, offering longer warranties increases
profit margins to a greater extent when used products are less reliable. In the presence of
a secondary market, we find that the benefit of longer warranties becomes non-monotonic.
Because the used-product cannibalization may emerge as the preeminent factor, producers
become less likely to offer longer warranties when their used products are unreliable. When
producers may engage in secondary market interference through a buy-back program to ad-
dress the used-product cannibalization and increase profits, they are also more likely to of-
fer longer warranties. Because of the used-product cannibalization and the limited efficacy
of producers’ buy-back programs, producers become less likely to offer longer warranties
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when their used products are less reliable. Nevertheless, the warranty-cost savings and the
improved efficacy of secondary market interference increase the profitability of offering
longer warranties when used products are unreliable. These findings, in general, support
the conventional wisdom that producers may benefit from offering longer warranties when
they concern their product reliability. They suggest that producers engaging in secondary
market interference are more likely to offer longer warranties when their used products are
sufficiently reliable.
We would like to note some of the limitations of our analytical model. First, as men-
tioned, our model is insufficient to address a product containing multiple components with
disproportional cost. Second, our model assumes that information is public, which elim-
inates potential warranty effects such as that warranties can address the adverse selection
problem (the lemon problem) in secondary markets caused by asymmetrical information.
Third, our model considers a monopolistic producer, while an effect of warranties is to sort
customers by their risk preference, which could play a strategic role in competition within
used products. Future research can expand to these areas.
Nonetheless, our study contributes to the literature by incorporating the effects of sec-
ondary markets (the resale value effect and the cannibalization effect) in examining durable-
goods producers’ warranty-length decisions. In particular, we highlight the trade-off be-
tween the increase in customers’ valuation and used-product cannibalization induced by
offering longer warranties. By exploring the joint effect of producers’ warranty-length
decisions and their secondary market interference, we also show that the engagement in
secondary market interference changes the balance between these secondary market ef-
fects and introduces an additional effect (the warranty-cost savings), resulting in significant
changes to the conditions under which offering longer warranties is more profitable. More




EMPIRICAL TESTS OF PRODUCT RELIABILITY ON PRODUCT WARRANTY
LENGTHS AND SECONDARY MARKETS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we conduct an empirical study that tests some of the insights coming out
of our theoretical model in the previous chapter. Specifically, we test three predicted rela-
tionships from our theoretical model: (i) warranty length and product reliability, (ii) extent
of buybacks and product reliability, and (iii) volume of trade in the secondary market and
product reliability. Linking several secondary data sources regarding the US automobile
market and applying the exploratory factor analysis and the panel-data analysis, we find
evidence that automobile producers provide longer warranties, particularly no-power-train
related warranties, when their used-vehicle reliability is near an extreme, i.e., either low or
high. In addition, we show that automobile producers’ buy-back activities decrease with
the reliability of their used vehicles while the trade volume of their used vehicles increases
with the reliability of used vehicles. Both are in line with our analytical predictions.
4.2 Empirical Context and Hypotheses
We choose the automobile industry as the context for our empirical study. Beyond the
growing attention devoted to the warranty lengths and after-sale service qualities in this
industry (Guajardo et al. 2016, Rao et al. 2009, Menezes & Currim 1992), it is also an
appropriate setting for our analysis for several reasons. First, automobiles are certainly
durable products, depreciate in use, and have active secondary markets. Second, automo-
bile producers actively engage in secondary market strategies such as trade-ins and buy-
back programs (Hendel & Lizzeri 2002, Johnson & Waldman 2003), which yields an ideal
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setting to study the interaction between producers’ warranty and buy-back decisions, and
volume of trade in secondary markets. Third, automobile producers commonly offer prod-
uct warranties that vary in coverage and change periodically, which allows us to explore
the reasons behind the variation in warranty decisions across producers.
There are also several context-specific factors that map some of the assumptions in our
analytical model. The average age of vehicles sold on the secondary market is 4.4 years
(Edmunds.com Inc. 2015) while the average life of automobiles is documented to be 10
years with the vehicle ownership data of Consumer Expenditure Survey. Our model ap-
proximates this observation with the use of a durable product that lasts for two periods.
Furthermore, the average length of basic warranties is 3.6 years and that of power-train
warranties is 5.2 years (based on warranty choices observed from our JL Warranty data).
This indicates that automobile producers offer product warranties to cover at least the first
period of product life, and that the timing of reselling a product coincides with the expira-
tion of warranties to an extent. Moreover, warranty coverage is consistent among vehicle
models, which allows us to examine producers’ warranty-length decisions using an analytic
model with a single product.
Corollary 3.4 suggests that a producer, which buys back some of its products from the
secondary market, will offer longer warranties when the reliability of their used products
are sufficiently low or high. Intuition suggests that while a producer may offer longer
warranties to compensate the perceived loss in valuation of their products due to reliability
concerns, the producer should be wary about the cannibalization induced by offering longer
warranties when their used products are less reliable. Hence, a producer can safely offer
longer warranties when its used products are highly reliable. As for a producer with un-
reliable used products, the producer would not need to worry about the cannibalization as
the low used-product valuation eases the cannibalization of new products, and the producer
would also enjoy additional cost savings from longer warranties by collecting in-warranty
used products. Accordingly, we empirically test the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 4.1 The association between a producer’s used-vehicle reliability and its war-
ranty length is curvilinear (U-shaped).
The third and fourth items of Corollary 3.2 suggest that a producer’s optimal buy-back
quantities decreases in the perceived reliability of its used cars, regardless of the producer’s








> 0). The same theoretical prediction
holds when we measure buy-back volume in terms of the ratio of buy-back quantities to








). Intuition suggests that less
reliable used products have lower valuation, thereby making buybacks more affordable for
producers. In addition, as offering longer warranties increases the valuation of less-reliable
used products more, it increases cannibalization and promotes producers to buy back to a
greater extent. Accordingly, we empirically test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.2 The extent of buy-backs is negatively associated with a producer’s used-
vehicle reliability.
We also empirically document the association between the volume of trade of a pro-
ducer’s used vehicles and their reliability. The quantity of used products remaining in the









2δ(1−δ) . For both cases, the
remaining used-product quantities decrease in fu. Intuitively, as producers buy back more
used products when used products are less reliable, customer-to-customer trade volume is
expected to decrease. Consequently, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.3 Trade volume in the secondary market is positively associated with a pro-
ducer’s used-vehicle reliability.
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4.3 Data, Measures, and Empirical Approach
4.3.1 Data
We obtained secondary data regarding the US automobile market from several sources.
The first is the Vehicle Dependability Study (VDS) from J. D. Power; the second is the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) administrated by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS); and the third is the detailed coverage information of manufacturing warranties col-
lected by JL Warranty.
Vehicle Dependability Study. J. D. Power conducts the VDS for vehicle models an-
nually and publishes their reliability scores. We chose this data because of its focus on
long-term dependability of vehicles after extensive use, and its broad use in measuring
used-vehicle reliability (NADA 2015, U.S. News & World Report 2016). To focus on long-
term reliability, VDS specifically surveys vehicle owners who have had a given vehicle for
three years. For example, for the 2013 VDS, J. D. Power selected a sample of owners who
registered their vehicles from September 2009 to February 2010 to maintain the ownership
period around three years. The study interviews these three-year original owners regarding
problems they encountered during the most recent year in nine different attributes such as
interior, HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning), and transmission. In addition,
VDS surveys problems related with breakdowns or malfunctions of a component or a fea-
ture. These cover reliability-related issues such as a component or a feature that functions
as designed but is difficult to use. J. D. Power uses the average number of problems per
hundred vehicles (PP100) of a model as the model’s reliability score. Hence, a lower score
indicates a more reliable model. J. D. Power also publishes the reliability score of automo-
bile producers, which weights the PP100 of a model of a producer by the sales of the model
to the total sales of the producer and then sums up the weighted PP100 as the producer’s
reliability score.
Consumer Expenditure Survey. The BLS administrates two surveys in CES: the in-
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terview survey and the diary survey quarterly. From a representative sample of the US
population, the interview survey captures the demographics, income, and asset information
of each consumer unit (household) and its major expenditures. The diary survey records
daily minor expenses and activities. The BLS then publishes public-use microdata that
combine the raw data collected in both surveys annually. For the purposes of this study,
we explore detailed responses related to vehicle ownership and transaction information of
each household in the interview survey.
Warranty Coverage in the Automobile Market. In the US automobile market, auto-
mobile producers sell new vehicles with product warranties (also known as manufacturer
warranties). Warranties are in various types including basic, power-train, and corrosion,
with coverage limits in time and mileage explicitly stated. In general, these warranties are
free of charge and mutually exclusive. In addition, producers may also offer warranties
covering components for emission control or the battery of hybrid vehicles. Nevertheless,
these three types of warranties, basic, power-train, and corrosion, are commonly offered
by all producers. A basic warranty covers factory-installed parts and some dealer-installed
accessories against defects and workmanship; a power-train warranty covers major power
components such as engine, transmission, and differential drive shaft assembly; and a cor-
rosion warranty covers rust-through perforation on sheet metal. JL Warranty, a company
focusing on warranty claim processing in the automotive industry, collects the detailed cov-
erage of producers’ warranties and publishes the Official Warranty Guide annually, from
where we extract the coverage of all three types of warranties in time and mileage.
4.3.2 Measures
Since a producer’s warranties are consistent among its models, we have producer-year as
our unit of analysis. Below we describe our measures in detail.
Warranty Lengths: As mentioned, automobile producers commonly offer product war-
ranties in six aspects: the coverage of basic warranties in year and mileage, the coverage
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of power-train warranties in year and mileage1, and the coverage of corrosion warranties
in year and mileage. For the sake of parsimony, we first perform an exploratory factor
analysis to examine the key factors underlying automobile producers’ warranties.
Table 4.1: Factor loadings of automobile producers’ 2008 warranty coverage
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
The coverage of basic warranties in year 0.9357 0.00920
The coverage of basic warranties in mileage 0.9346 0.1012
The coverage of power-train warranties in year 0.1544 0.8696
The coverage of power-train warranties in mileage -0.0226 0.7191
The coverage of corrosion warranties in year 0.5229 -0.1078
The coverage of corrosion warranties in mileage 0.4016 0.4137
Notes: The pattern matrix from the orthogonal varimax rotation.
The factor analysis reveals that two key factors explain automobile producers’ war-
ranties (see Table 4.1). Although the interpretation of the resulting factors is a concern
when using factor analysis, our result has a clear interpretation. The first factor strongly
relates to the coverage of non-power-train warranties, whereas the second key factor repre-
sents the coverage of power-train specific warranties. The scatter plot of resulting scores by
producers (Figure 4.1) further highlights distinctive characteristics in producers’ warranty-
length decisions. Some automobile producers like Kia, Lexus, and Smart have their war-
ranties positively correlated between the two key factors, whereas producers like BMW,
Volvo, and Suzuki seem to have their warranties negatively correlated between the two
factors.
More importantly, the finding indicates that producers’ decisions on non-power-train-
1The power-train warranties of Kia and Hyundai are partially transferable. Therefore, we use the trans-
ferable portion of their warranties in our analysis. Nevertheless, our results remain unchanged if we use the
original coverage of their warranties
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Figure 4.1: Resulting scores of automobile producers’ 2008 warranty coverage
related warranties and power-train-specific warranties are significantly different, and that
these decisions should be investigated separately. Therefore, we denote the resulting score
of the first factor of producer i at year t as WarrantyLength NonPoweri,t and use it as
a proxy for the length of non-power-train-related warranties. We also denote the resulting
score of the second factor as WarrantyLength Poweri,t and use it as a proxy for the
length of power-train-specific warranties.
Extent of Buy-backs: We identify transactions in the CES that indicate households trad-
ing in their used vehicles as buy-back activities and count the number of such transactions.
Since expenditures pertaining to vehicles are only reported for a reference period that is
three months before the moment when a household was interviewed, we multiply that num-
ber by 4 to estimate the number of annual trade-ins, and denote it as UsedTradeInsi,t.
In addition, we normalize the measure by the total vehicle ownership of the producer,
TotalStocki,t, to control for differences in market size. The measure shows a fraction of
the stock being traded-in, and we use it as a proxy for the extent of buy-backs. Furthermore,
to control for the extreme value issue, we take the natural log of the value. As a result, we
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Trade Volume in the Secondary Market: Leveraging vehicle ownership information in
the CES, we obtain the number of used-vehicle purchases, UsedPurchasesi,t, by counting
the newly added ownership of used vehicles of producer i from the previous October to the
September of year t. We then define the trade volume in the secondary market as:





Similar to the approach defining the extent of buy-backs, we also normalize the measure by
the total stock of a producer and take the natural log of the value.
Producer’s Used-Vehicle Reliability: We construct our key independent variable using
automobile producers’ reliability scores from J. D. Power’s VDS. For ease of interpretation,
we take the negative of the sales-weighted PP100 and divide it by 100. The used-vehicle





As a result, UsedReliabilityi,t is always negative, and a higher UsedReliabilityi,t indi-
cates a automobile producer with more reliable used vehicle. In addition, to strengthen
the link between a producer’s used-vehicle reliability and its warranty-length decision,
we further categorize problems in the VDS by distinguishing them as non-power-train-
related problems or power-train-specific problems, and obtain the producer’s non-power-
train reliability as UsedReliability NonPoweri,t, and power-train related reliability as
UsedReliability Poweri,t. Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations of our
measures.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variables Mean S.D Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6
1
Used-Vehicle
Reliability -1.686 0.450 -3.443 -0.707
2
Non-Power-Train








Warranty Length 0.000 0.960 -2.531 2.080 0.115 0.113 0.088
5
Power-Train




Buy-backs -4.553 0.524 -6.265 -2.979 -0.202





-2.835 0.474 -4.595 - 1.099 -0.046 -0.041 -0.052 0.043 -0.154∗∗ 0.099
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
4.3.3 Empirical Approaches
We obtained data from 2008 to 2013 and constructed our measures for this time period. As
a result, our dataset is an unbalanced panel dataset.2 By employing a panel data model,
we can observe automobile producers’ used-vehicle reliability and their warranty-length
decisions over time, and control for the impact of mis-measured or omitted variables across
producers and time.
To examine the curvilinear relationship proposed in Hypothesis 1, we incorporate the
quadratic term of the independent variable, and expect the coefficients of the linear term
and the quadratic term to be positive and statistically significant. We test the hypothesis for
both the length of non-power-train warranties and the length of power-train warranties with
26 of 37 automobile producers miss some of their reliability scores because of insufficient survey samples
or ceased operations during our observation window. All of our results hold if we conduct our tests on a
balanced dataset by excluding these producers.
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the corresponding reliability. Consequently, we use the following two empirical models:
WarrantyLength NonPoweri,t =
β1 UsedReliability NonPoweri,t + β2 UsedReliability NonPoweri,t
2 + γt + εi,t,
WarrantyLength Poweri,t =
β1 UsedReliability Poweri, t+ β2 UsedReliability Poweri,t
2 + γt + εi,t.
γt represents time fixed effects to account for macro-level temporal conditions. To choose
a proper specification, we conduct a number of diagnostic tests. When the length of non-
power-train warranties is the dependent variable, the Hausman test that assesses a random
effect specification versus a fixed effect specification for the model does not reject the
null hypothesis (χ2 = 5.76 with p = 0.330), suggesting estimators from a random effect
specification are consistent. However, the result of the Breusch-Pagan test (χ2 = 385.75
with p < 0.001) indicates the existence of groupwise heteroscedasticity, and the result
of the Wooldridge test raises a concern regarding autocorrelation (F = 4.59 with p =
0.040). Therefore, we deploy a GLS specification with panel-specific AR(1) to control for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. When the length of power-train warranties is the
dependent variable, the results are similar except that the result of the Wooldridge test does
not raise a concern regarding autocorrelation (F = 2.74 with p = 0.107). Therefore, we
deploy a GLS specification and control for heteroscedasticity.
To examine our second and third hypotheses, we regress the extent of buy-backs and
the trade volume in the secondary market on producers’ used-vehicle reliability. When the
extent of buy-backs is the dependent variable, the result of the Hausman test (χ2(4) = 8.77
with p = 0.187) suggests that a random effect specification is consistent and efficient.
The result of the Wooldridge test further indicates no concern for autocorrelation (F =
2.23 with p = 0.146). Nevertheless, the result of the Breusch-Pagan test still indicates
the existence of heteroscedasticity (χ2 = 25.92 with p < 0.001). Therefore, we also
deploy a GLS specification and control for heteroscedasticity for the following model to
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test Hypothesis 2:
BuyBacki,t = β1 UsedReliabilityi,t + γt + εi,t.
When the trade volume in the secondary market is the dependent variable, the result of the
Hausman test (χ2(4) = 18.49 with p = 0.001) indicates that to obtain consistent estimators,
a fixed effect specification is needed. In addition, the result of the modified Wald test
(χ2 = 158.87 with p < 0.001) and that of the Wooldridge test (F = 5.771 with p = 0.022)
indicate the existence of groupwise heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Therefore, we
incorporate producer fixed effects, αi, and the lagged dependent variable, and use robust
standard errors. Consequently, the model for Hypothesis 3 is:
UsedTradeV olumei,t =
β1 UsedReliabilityi,t + αi + γt + λ UsedTradeV olumei,t−1 + εi,t.
4.4 Results
We present our main results in Table 4.3. The result of model 1 in Table 4.3 shows that the
association between the length of non-power-train-related warranties and non-power-train
reliability is convex (β1 = 1.175 with p = 0.000 and β2 = 0.303 with p = 0.000), which
supports our Hypothesis 1. However, while the result of model 2 shows that the relationship
between the length of power-train warranties and power-train reliability is also convex, the
estimator of the quadratic term is statistically insignificant (β1 = 2.724 with p = 0.067 and
β2 = 2.256 with p = 0.250). Therefore, we find partial support for our Hypothesis 1 and
show that automobile producers are more likely to offer longer warranties, particularly on
basic warranties, when their used-vehicle reliability is either high or low compared to that
when their reliability is at market average.
From the result of model 3 in Table 4.3, we find that the association between the ex-
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Table 4.3: Main results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4











Lagged UsedTradeV olume -0.139∗
(0.073)
Observations 198 198 177 158
χ2 49.02 31.35 25.96
R2 0.1911
Producer fixed effects N N N Y
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
tent of buy-backs and used-vehicle reliability is negative and statistically significant (β1 is
−0.348 with p < 0.001), which supports our Hypothesis 2. From the result of model 4, we
also find that the association between the trade volume of a producer’s used vehicles in the
secondary market and used-vehicle reliability is positive and statistically significant (β1 is
0.783 with p < 0.001), which supports our Hypothesis 3.
4.5 Robustness Checks
We then examine the robustness of our main findings to: (i) alternative measures for pro-
ducers’ used-vehicle reliability and (ii) alternative measures and an alternative model for
the secondary market trade volume. Tables of results for the robustness checks are included
in the Appendix.
4.5.1 Producer’s Used-Vehicle Reliability
As mentioned, the VDS calculates producers’ reliability score by weighting the PP100
of vehicle models by their sales. To control for any potential influence from the sales-
77
weighting mechanism, we obtain producers’ un-weighted reliability scores, which simply
averages reliability scores across vehicle models. We also obtain their un-weighted non-
power-train reliability and un-weighted power-train reliability scores. The results corre-
sponding to these alternative measures (reported in Table C.1 of Appendix) are similar
to our main results. Additionally, we find support for Hypothesis 1 from the association
between the length of power-train warranties and power-train reliability.
We also regress the length of non-power-train warranties and that of power-train war-
ranties on producers’ overall reliability scores. The results (reported in models 2-1 and 2-2,
respectively, in Table C.2 of Appendix) still partially support our Hypothesis 1. That is, we
find support for our Hypothesis 1 from the association between the length of non-power-
train warranties and non-power-train reliability, but not from the association between the
length of power-train warranties and power-train reliability. We further alternate the non-
power-train reliability and the power-train reliability to examine the consistency of findings
regarding Hypothesis 2 and 3. The results (models 2-3 to 2-6 in Table C.2 of Appendix)
similarly support our findings.
4.5.2 Trade Volume in the Secondary Market
We construct an alternative measure for the volume of trade in the secondary market as
specified in Rao et al. (2009):
V OTi,t = ln
(




UsedSalesi,t is the number of transactions that indicate used vehicles are sold (not traded-
in) in the CES. Since such transactions are also reported in a three-month reference period
only, we multiply that number by 4 to approximate annual used-vehicle sales. The re-
sult of using this alternative dependent variable also supports our Hypothesis 3 (model
3-1 in Appendix Table C.3). In addition, we use another measure in which we exclude
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UsedTradeInsi,t, and the result is still consistent (model 3-2 in Appendix Table C.3). Fur-
thermore, because the ordinary least square regression on a dynamic panel data model with
fixed effects does not address potential biases caused by the lagged dependent variable, we
deploy the Arellano-Bond model, a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) specifica-
tion, to control for possible biases. The result still supports our Hypothesis 3 (model 3-3 in
Appendix Table C.3)
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
We find evidence that the relationship between automobile producers’ non-power-train re-
liability and the length of basic warranties is curvilinear (U-shaped), which supports our
Hypothesis 1. However, we do not find support for such a relationship between producers’
power-train reliability and the length of power-train warranties, i.e., the result suggests that
the relationship is linear and negative. We propose two potential explanations for this find-
ing: first, the repair or replacement cost of power-train components is known to be higher
than that of non-power-train components. As mentioned in Corollary 3.4, when the war-
ranty cost factor Cw is not sufficiently small, threshold f ′′PP > 1 , resulting in a threshold
policy for the warranty-length decision. Producers are less likely to offer longer warranties
when its used-product reliability is low, which is consistent with the finding. Second, our
analysis examines a producer’s decision at the product level. The model may not be suffi-
cient to address a circumstance where a component has a disproportionate cost compared
to its value. More specifically, while the value of power-train components may not be pro-
portional to the cost of their repair or replacement, the producer’s decision on whether to
exercise a buy-back program still relies on unit-level prices and costs. This explanation cer-
tainly warrants an area for future exploration. Regarding automobile producers’ buy-back
activities and the trade volume of their used vehicles with respect to used-vehicle reliabil-
ity, we find support for Hypothesis 2 and 3. More specifically, we show that an automobile
producer with better use-vehicle reliability buys back fewer of its used vehicles and that
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the trade volume of its used vehicles is greater.
We recognize that our empirical findings may be subject to the data sources that we use
for our measures. For example, because of VDS’s methodology, our reliability measure
is limited to vehicles that are in use for three years. While a broader and better mea-
sure that comprehensively captures the reliability of products over time is always highly
desirable, the VDS is recognized as one of the most well-known sources regarding used
vehicle reliability (NADA 2015). Meanwhile, while the CES is often used as a source
for vehicle ownership and related transactions (Rao et al. 2009, Peterson & Schneider
2016), it mainly focuses on consumer expenditures and does not capture additional infor-
mation, such as whether a used vehicle is purchased from or traded into a dealer of the same
producer. Nevertheless, obtaining comprehensive transaction details across producers and
between customers for widely-used durable goods such as automobiles is always challeng-
ing, and the CES is perhaps the most credible and representative data source (Rao et al.
2009). Lastly, while our analytical and empirical examinations focus on the US automobile
market, our findings and insights may be applicable to other durable products with active
secondary markets.
Notwithstanding the above, our empirical findings in the US automobile market support
our analytical predictions, and they are robust to alternative measures of our key indepen-
dent variable, used-vehicle reliability, and to alternative measures for secondary market
trade volume. Most importantly, supported by both the analytical study (chapter 3) and the
empirical work (chapter 4), we offer a compelling explanation to durable-goods producers’
decisions on the length of product warranties with respect to product reliability. Offering
longer warranties can be profitable when the reliability of used products and the engage-
ment of secondary market interference are properly aligned. Producers should evaluate






TABLES OF RESULTS FOR ROBUSTNESS CHECKS IN CHAPTER 2
Table A.1: PointsRatio as an alternative measure of change in relative assessed hazard
level
Variables Model 1 ER Model 2 SR Model 3 ∆EOP Model 4 ER Model 5 SR Model 6 ∆EOP
PointsRatio = Increase 3.63∗∗ 3.22∗ -2.29 3.38∗∗ 3.16∗ -2.21
(0.04) (0.05) (0.45) (0.06) (0.06) (0.46)
Leanness 14.71∗∗ 8.46∗ -13.76∗
(0.00) (0.08) (0.07)
Leanness -12.01∗∗ -2.63 6.49
when PointsRatio = Increase (0.03) (0.58) (0.47)
Market concentration 20.52∗∗ 14.47 8.75 20.80∗∗ 14.86 9.12
(0.03) (0.16) (0.56) (0.03) (0.15) (0.54)
Industry growth -0.00 -0.01 0.05∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01 0.05∗∗∗
(0.88) (0.56) (0.00) (0.86) (0.54) (0.00)
Operating scale change -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.02
(0.79) (0.46) (0.40) (0.80) (0.45) (0.37)
Facility size -15.72∗∗∗ -20.61∗∗∗ 11.94 -15.75∗∗∗ -20.60∗∗∗ 11.98
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19)
Facility size∧2 1.59∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ -1.33 1.59∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ -1.35
(0.01) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01) (0.00) (0.17)
Operational complexity -1.54∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.29 -1.71∗∗∗ -0.07 -0.17
(0.00) (0.81) (0.25) (0.00) (0.80) (0.51)
Lagged ER -0.41∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ER∧2 -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Lagged SR -0.45∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged SR∧2 -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Lagged ∆EOP -0.46∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ∆EOP∧2 -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
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Table A.1: PointsRatio as an alternative measure of change in relative assessed hazard
level (continued)
Variables Model 1 ER Model 2 SR Model 3 ∆EOP Model 4 ER Model 5 SR Model 6 ∆EOP
Observations 43,400 43,400 14,622 43,400 43,400 14,622
R-squared 0.2139 0.2288 0.2346 0.2144 0.2290 0.2349
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10; Fixed effect estimates are omitted for brevity. In
model 4 (emissions reductions), the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3 = 2.70 with p = 0.623. In model
5 (use of source reduction), the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3 = 5.83 with p = 0.272. In model 6
(use of EOP treatment), the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3 = −7.27 with p = 0.445.
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Table A.2: RankRatio as an alternative measure of change in relative assessed hazard level
Variables Model 1 ER Model 2 SR Model 3 ∆EOP Model 4 ER Model 5 SR Model 6 ∆EOP
RelHazard = No Change -1.07 -0.21 -4.07 -0.77 -0.70 -4.02
(0.73) (0.94) (0.43) (0.81) (0.82) (0.43)
RelHazard = Increased 7.08∗∗ 4.79 1.14 7.31∗∗ 4.73 0.87
(0.02) (0.11) (0.78) (0.02) (0.11) (0.83)
RankRatio -0.50 18.04 -7.64 -11.16 21.98 -0.72
when RelHazard = Increased (0.31) (0.22) (0.45) (0.37) (0.18) (0.41)
Leanness 6.14 15.31∗∗ -22.19∗
(0.47) (0.04) (0.07)
Leanness -3.81 -16.60∗ 19.75
when RelHazard = No Change (0.70) (0.08) (0.25)
Leanness 4.46 -1.69 13.99
when RelHazard = Increased (0.65) (0.84) (0.28)
Leanness × RankRatio -157.18 86.39 -12.04
(0.35) (0.64) (0.96)
Leanness × RankRatio 49.08 -153.91 37.91
when RelHazard = Increased (0.79) (0.43) (0.89)
Market concentration 20.92∗∗ 14.90 8.20 22.02∗∗ 16.22 9.20
(0.03) (0.15) (0.58) (0.02) (0.12) (0.54)
Industry growth -0.00 -0.01 0.05∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01 0.05∗∗∗
(0.88) (0.56) (0.00) (0.84) (0.51) (0.00)
Operating scale change -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.02
(0.79) (0.46) (0.39) (0.82) (0.44) (0.33)
Facility size -15.64∗∗∗ -20.56∗∗∗ 11.99 -15.62∗∗∗ -20.60∗∗∗ 11.70
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20)
Facility size∧2 1.58∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ -1.34 1.58∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ -1.34
(0.01) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01) (0.00) (0.18)
Operational complexity -1.52 0.07 -0.28 -1.69∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.17
(0.00) (0.78) (0.27) (0.00) (0.87) (0.50)
Lagged ER -0.41∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ER∧2 -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Lagged SR -0.45∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged SR∧2 -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
84
Table A.2: RankRatio as an alternative measure of change in relative assessed hazard level
(Continued)
Variables Model 1 ER Model 2 SR Model 3 ∆EOP Model 4 ER Model 5 SR Model 6 ∆EOP
Lagged ∆EOP -0.46∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ∆EOP∧2 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 43,400 43,400 14,622 43,400 43,400 14,622
R-squared 0.2141 0.2290 0.2350 0.2145 0.2293 0.2356
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10; The estimated coefficients for RelHazard = No
Change are grayed out for readability; Fixed effect estimates are omitted for brevity. To interpret the effect of leanness, we set the
RankRatio value for an increase in relative assessed hazard level to be one standard deviation above the mean (i.e., µRankRatio
+σRankRatio) whereas we set the value for a decrease in relative assessed hazard level to be one standard deviation below the
mean (i.e., µRankRatio −σRankRatio), where µRankRatio = 0.001 and σRankRatio = 0.046. Let β4 be the coefficient of
Leanness×RankRatio when RelHazard = Decreased and β5 be the coefficient of Leanness×RankRatio when
RelHazard = Increased. In model 4, the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Decreased is β2 +β4 × (µRankRatio
−σRankRatio) = 13.55 with p = 0.016 while the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3
+(β4 + β5)× (µRankRatio + σRankRatio) = −5.80 with p = 0.310. In model 5, the effect of leanness when RelHazard =
decreased is β2 +β4 × (µRankRatio − σRankRatio) = 11.24 with p = 0.059 while the effect of leanness when RelHazard =
Increased is β2 + β3 +(β4 + β5)× (µRankRatio + σRankRatio) = 10.62 with p = 0.049. In model 6, the effect of leanness
when RelHazard = decreased is β2 +β4 × (µRankRatio − σRankRatio) = 21.63 with p = 0.035 while the effect of leanness
when RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3 +(β4 + β5)× (µRankRatio + σRankRatio) = 7.06 with p = 0.453.
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Table A.3: Using all chemicals in the SPL, and PointsRatio as the measure of change in
relative assessed hazard level
Variables Model 1 ER Model 2 SR Model 3 ∆EOP Model 4 ER Model 5 SR Model 6 ∆EOP
PointsRatio = Increase 2.89∗∗ 3.19∗ 0.84 2.75∗ 3.09∗∗ -0.96
(0.04) (0.02) (0.70) (0.05) (0.02) (0.66)
Leanness 13.66∗∗∗ 9.33∗∗∗ -15.93∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Leanness -7.96∗∗ -4.71 4.02
when PointsRatio = Increase (0.05) (0.18) (0.53)
Market concentration 22.67∗∗∗ 25.08∗∗∗ 0.91 23.01∗∗∗ 25.38∗∗∗ 1.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.94) (0.00) (0.00) (0.93)
Industry growth 0.00 -0.00 0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.00 0.04∗∗∗
(0.78) (0.62) (0.00) (0.80) (0.61) (0.00)
Operating scale change -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(1.00) (0.50) (0.88) (0.94) (0.47) (0.96)
Facility size -13.03∗∗∗ -18.38∗∗∗ 15.45∗∗ -13.03∗∗∗ -18.38∗∗∗ 15.56∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
Facility size∧2 1.39∗∗∗ 2.30∗∗∗ -1.77∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 2.30∗∗∗ -1.80∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
Operational complexity -1.42∗∗∗ 0.23 -0.56∗∗∗ -1.59∗∗∗ 0.10 -0.41∗∗
(0.00) (0.26) (0.01) (0.00) (0.62) (0.04)
Lagged ER -0.42∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ER∧2 -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Lagged SR -0.44∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged SR∧2 -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ∆EOP -0.44∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ∆EOP∧2 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Observations 65,533 65,533 25,600 65,533 65,533 25,600
R-squared 0.2163 0.2273 0.2252 0.2167 0.2275 0.2257
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10; Fixed effect estimates are omitted for brevity. In
model 4, the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3 = 6.40 with p = 0.199. In model 5, the effect of leanness
when RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3 = 4.62 with p = 0.251. In model 6, the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Increased
is β2 + β3 = −11.37 with p = 0.104.
86
Table A.4: Rank variance to mean ratio (RankV artoMeanRatio) as an additional ex-
planatory variable
Variables Model 1 ER Model 2 SR Model 3 ∆EOP Model 4 ER Model 5 SR Model 6 ∆EOP
RelHazard = No Change -1.60 0.12 -4.84 -1.08 -0.36 -6.88∗
(0.48) (0.96) (0.19) (0.66) (0.87) (0.10)
RelHazard = Increased 4.98∗∗ 3.51∗ -0.09 4.60∗∗ 4.03∗∗ -3.86
(0.01) (0.06) (0.98) (0.03) (0.04) (0.27)
Leanness 11.79∗∗ 11.83∗∗ -21.52∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Leanness -1.91 -12.95∗ 19.26
when RelHazard = No Change (0.47) (0.94) (0.17)
Leanness -4.45 -0.38 13.46
when RelHazard = Increased (0.47) (0.94) (0.17)
RankVartoMeanRatio 0.45 0.32 0.71 0.52 0.34 0.65
(0.24) (0.47) (0.36) (0.22) (0.51) (0.42)
RankVartoMeanRatio -0.51 0.15 1.48
when RelHazard = No Change (0.52) (0.85) (0.35)
RankVartoMeanRatio 0.09 0.11 1.20∗∗
when RelHazard = Increased (0.76) (0.84) (0.00)
Market concentration 20.92∗∗ 14.99 8.40 21.83∗∗ 16.18 8.97
(0.03) (0.15) (0.58) (0.02) (0.12) (0.55)
Industry growth -0.00 -0.01 0.05∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01 0.05∗∗∗
(0.85) (0.54) (0.00) (0.81) (0.51) (0.00)
Operating scale change -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.02
(0.81) (0.45) (0.40) (0.84) (0.44) (0.36)
Facility size -15.66∗∗∗ -20.59∗∗∗ 11.85 -15.66∗∗∗ -20.62∗∗∗ 11.96
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19)
Facility size∧2 1.58∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ -1.32 1.58∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ -1.34
(0.01) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01) (0.00) (0.18)
Operational complexity -1.54∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.29 -1.70∗∗∗ -0.05 -0.19
(0.00) (0.82) (0.26) (0.00) (0.83) (0.45)
Lagged ER -0.41∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ER∧2 -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Lagged SR -0.45∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged SR∧2 -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
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Table A.4: Rank variance to mean ratio (RankV artoMeanRatio) as an additional ex-
planatory variable (continued)
Variables Model 1 ER Model 2 SR Model 3 ∆EOP Model 4 ER Model 5 SR Model 6 ∆EOP
Lagged ∆EOP -0.46∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ∆EOP∧2 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 43,400 43,400 14,622 43,400 43,400 14,622
R-squared 0.2140 0.2289 0.2348 0.2143 0.2292 0.2364
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10; The estimated coefficients for RelHazard = No
Change are grayed out for readability; Fixed effect estimates are omitted for brevity. In model 4, the effect of leanness when
RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3 = 6.24 with p = 0.194. In model 5, the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Increased is
β2 + β3 = 11.45 with p = 0.029. In model 6, the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3 = −8.06 with
p = 0.380. In model 6, the effect of rank variance on the use of EOP treatment when RelHazard = Increased is 1.84 with
p = 0.040.
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Table A.5: Local Environmental Preference (LCVH) as an additional explanatory variable
Variables Model 1 ER Model 2 SR Model 3 ∆EOP Model 4 ER Model 5 SR Model 6 ∆EOP
RelHazard = No Change -1.72 0.48 -4.26 -1.86 0.16 -3.98
(0.45) (0.82) (0.25) (0.41) (0.94) (0.27)
RelHazard = Increased 5.00∗∗ 3.36∗ -1.58 4.77∗∗ 3.38∗ -1.47
(0.01) (0.07) (0.62) (0.02) (0.06) (0.64)
Leanness 10.59∗ 11.52∗∗ -20.04∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Leanness -1.91 -14.48∗∗ 18.00
when RelHazard = No Change (0.83) (0.05) (0.23)
Leanness -3.78 -1.06 -12.89
when RelHazard = Increased (0.55) (0.84) (0.18)
LCVH -0.01 0.30∗∗ -0.10 0.04 0.27∗∗ -0.08
(0.94) (0.01) (0.60) (0.79) (0.03) (0.71)
LCVH -0.50 0.03 -0.07
when RelHazard = No Change (0.63) (0.76) (0.68)
LCVH -0.09 0.05 0.00
when RelHazard = Increased (0.30) (0.55) (1.00)
Market concentration 20.93∗∗ 15.00 8.14 21.69∗∗ 16.19 9.02
(0.03) (0.15) (0.59) (0.02) (0.12) (0.55)
Industry growth 0.00 -0.01 0.05∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01 0.05∗∗∗
(0.99) (0.71) (0.00) (0.98) (0.66) (0.00)
Operating scale change -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.02
(0.89) (0.34) (0.42) (0.90) (0.33) (0.37)
Facility size -16.10∗∗∗ -19.95∗∗∗ 12.47 -16.15∗∗∗ -19.96∗∗∗ 12.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18)
Facility size∧2 1.69∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ -1.42 1.70∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ -1.41
(0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15)
Operational complexity -1.50∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.31 -1.65∗∗∗ -0.11 -0.22
(0.00) (0.95) (0.22) (0.00) (0.67) (0.40)
Lagged ER -0.41∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ER∧2 -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Lagged SR -0.45∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged SR∧2 -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
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Table A.5: Local Environmental Preference (LCVH) as an additional explanatory variable
(continued)
Variables Model 1 ER Model 2 SR Model 3 ∆EOP Model 4 ER Model 5 SR Model 6 ∆EOP
Lagged ∆EOP -0.46∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ∆EOP∧2 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 43,167 43,167 14,550 43,167 43,167 14,550
R-squared 0.2153 0.2296 0.2342 0.2155 0.2299 0.2347
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10; The estimated coefficients for RelHazard = No
Change are grayed out for readability; Fixed effect estimates are omitted for brevity. In model 4, the effect of leanness when
RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3 = 6.81 with p = 0.222. In model 5, the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Increased is
β2 + β3 = 10.46 with p = 0.047. In model 6, the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3 = −7.15 with
p = 0.438.
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Table A.6: Industry regulation (GED VA Ratio) as an additional explanatory variable
Variables Model 1 ER Model 2 SR Model 3 ∆EOP Model 4 ER Model 5 SR Model 6 ∆EOP
RelHazard = No Change -1.25 0.24 -4.63 -1.39 -0.39 -4.87
(0.58) (0.91) (0.21) (0.55) (0.86) (0.18)
RelHazard = Increased 4.87∗∗ 3.42∗ -1.09 4.44∗∗ 3.12∗ -1.30
(0.02) (0.06) (0.73) (0.03) (0.09) (0.68)
Leanness 11.86∗∗ 11.89∗∗ -21.72∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Leanness -2.12 -13.08∗ 18.82
when RelHazard = No Change (0.77) (0.07) (0.21)
Leanness -4.33 -0.43 14.18
when RelHazard = Increased (0.49) (0.94) (0.15)
GED VA Ratio 1.61∗∗∗ -0.47 0.57 1.77∗∗∗ -0.18 0.17
(0.00) (0.21) (0.31) (0.00) (0.66) (0.79)
GED VA Ratio -0.08 -0.51∗ 0.69
when RelHazard = No Change (0.81) (0.08) (0.15)
GED VA Ratio -0.48∗∗ -0.30∗ 0.38
when RelHazard = Increased (0.02) (0.09) (0.14)
Market concentration 22.81∗∗ 14.39 8.85 23.77∗∗ 15.44 9.69
(0.02) (0.16) (0.55) (0.01) (0.14) (0.52)
Industry growth 0.01 -0.01 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.01 0.06∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.41) (0.00) (0.51) (0.36) (0.00)
Operating scale change -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.02
(0.76) (0.44) (0.40) (0.77) (0.42) (0.32)
Facility size -15.99∗∗∗ -20.55∗∗∗ 11.57 -16.12∗∗∗ -20.70∗∗∗ 11.68
(0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20)
Facility size∧2 1.62∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ -1.29 1.62∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗ -1.32
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18)
Operational complexity -1.53∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.29 -1.68∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.17
(0.00) (0.82) (0.26) (0.00) (0.82) (0.51)
Lagged ER -0.41∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ER∧2 -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Lagged SR -0.45∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged SR∧2 -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
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Table A.6: Industry regulation (GED VA Ratio) as an additional explanatory variable (con-
tinued)
Variables Model 1 ER Model 2 SR Model 3 ∆EOP Model 4 ER Model 5 SR Model 6 ∆EOP
Lagged ∆EOP -0.46∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Lagged ∆EOP∧2 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 43,398 43,398 14,622 43,398 43,398 14,622
R-squared 0.2145 0.2289 0.2348 0.2149 0.2293 0.2359
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10; The estimated coefficients for RelHazard = No
Change are grayed out for readability; Fixed effect estimates are omitted for brevity. In model 4, the effect of leanness when
RelHazard = Increased is β2 + β3 = 7.53 with p = 0.176. In model 5, the effect of leanness when RelHazard = Increased is




PROOFS OF CHAPTER 3
B.1 Benchmark Model
We first solve the producer’s problem if it offers short warranties and assume ρ→ 1. Since
strategy NSNS is active if θS1 < 1, we identify the solutions in the following conditions:
Case S1 (θS1 ≤ 1): The condition implies P Sn ≤ 1 − (1 − fu)δ. Since all three customer
strategies, NSNS , NSKS , and II ,are active, QSn(P
S















1−(1−fu)2δ2 and is negative when 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ fu ≤ 1). The KKT Lagrangian
equation is L = ΠS + λ1(1 − (1 − fu)δ − P Sn ) and the KKT conditions are: (1) ∂L∂PSn = 0,
(2)λ1( ∂L∂λ1 ) = 0⇒ λ1(1− (1− fu)δ−P
S
n ) = 0,(3)λ1 ≥ 0, and (4)1− (1− fu)δ−P Sn ≥ 0.
We also incorporate following conditions for the feasibility of the solution: (i) 1 > fu > 0,
(ii) 1 > δ > 0, and (iii) C ≥ 0. The analysis identifies two candidate solutions: So-
lution 1 (P Sn = 1 − (1 − fu)δ): We solve λ1 ≥ 0 and ∂L∂PSn = 0 simultaneously and
get λ1 =
C−(1−(1−fu)δ)2
1−(1−fu)2δ2 and a condition (1 − (1 − fu)δ)
2 ≤ C ≤ 1 − (1 − fu)δ. In






∗, and ΠS∗ = (1−fu)δ(1−C−(1−fu)δ)
1+(1−fu)δ . Solu-
tion 2 (P Sn < 1 − (1 − fu)δ): We solve λ1 = 0 and ∂L∂PSn ≥ 0 simultaneously and




















Case S2 (θS1 ≥ 1): The condition implies P Sn ≥ 1− (1− fu)δ. Since only customer strate-
gies NSKS and II are active, QSn(P
S














problem is also concave in P Sn (i.e.,
∂2ΠS
∂PSn
2 = − 11+(1−fu)δ and is negative when 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ fu ≤ 1). The KKT Lagrangian equation is L = ΠS + λ1(P Sn − (1 − (1 − fu)δ))
and the KKT conditions are: (1) ∂L
∂PSn
= 0, (2)λ1( ∂L∂λ1 ) = 0⇒ λ1(P
S
n − (1− (1− fu)δ)) =
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0,(3)λ1 ≥ 0, and (4)P Sn −(1−(1−fu)δ) ≥ 0. We also incorporate following conditions for
the feasibility of the solution: (i) 1 > fu > 0, (ii) 1 > δ > 0, and (iii) C ≥ 0. The analysis
identifies two candidate solutions: Solution 1 (P Sn = 1− (1− fu)δ): We solve λ1 ≥ 0 and
∂L
∂PSn
= 0 simultaneously and get λ1 =
1−3(1−fu)δ−C
2(1+(1−fu)δ) and a condition C ≤ 1 − 3(1 − fu)δ.






∗, and ΠS∗ = (1−fu)δ(1−C−(1−fu)δ)
1+(1−fu)δ . Solution 2
(P Sn > 1 − (1 − fu)δ): We solve λ1 = 0 and ∂L∂PSn ≥ 0 simultaneously and get a condition














We compare the optimal profits and find that the optimal profit of S1 is greater than























2 + 2δ(1− fu)
)
< (1− (1−fu)δ)2 < 1+







We then solve the producer’s problem if it offers long warranties. There are also two
cases:
Case L1 (θL1 ≤ 1): The condition implies PLn ≤ 1− δ. Since all three customer strategies
are active, QLn(P
L












2 = − 21−δ2 and is negative when 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1). The KKT Lagrangian equation




0 ⇒ λ1(PLn − (1 − δ)) = 0,(3)λ1 ≥ 0, and (4)PLn − (1 − δ) ≥ 0. We also incorporate
following conditions for the feasibility of the solution: (i) 1 > fu > 0, (ii) 1 > δ > 0, (iii)
C ≥ 0, and (iv) Cw ≥ 0. The analysis also identifies two candidate solutions: Solution 1
(PLn = 1− δ): We solve λ1 ≥ 0 and ∂L∂PLn = 0 simultaneously and get λ1 =
C−(1−δ)2−fuδCw
1−δ2
and condition (1 − δ)2 + fuδCw < C < 1 − δ − fuCw when (1 + δ)fuCw + δ2 ≤ δ. In





∗, and ΠS∗ = δ(1−C−δ−fuCw)
1+δ
. Solution 2 (PLn < 1− δ):
We solve λ1 = 0 and ∂L∂PLn ≥ 0 simultaneously and get conditions: (i) C < (1−δ)
2 +fuδCw
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when (1 + δ)fuCw + δ2 ≤ δ and (ii) C < 1 + δfuCw − δ2 − 2
√
δ (1− δ2) fuCw when
(1+ δ)fuCw + δ


















Case L2 (θL1 ≥ 1): The condition implies PLn ≥ 1 − δ. Since only customer strategies
NLKL and II are active, QLn(P
L













. The producer’s problem
is still concave in PLn (i.e.,
∂2ΠL
∂PLn
2 = − 11+δ and is negative when 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1). The KKT
Lagrangian equation isL = ΠL+λ1(PLn −(1−δ)) and the KKT conditions are: (1) ∂L∂PLn = 0,
(2)λ1( ∂L∂λ1 ) = 0 ⇒ λ1(P
L
n − (1 − δ)) = 0,(3)λ1 ≥ 0, and (4)PLn − (1 − δ) ≥ 0. We also
incorporate following conditions for the feasibility of the solution: (i) 1 > fu > 0, (ii)
1 > δ > 0, (iii) C ≥ 0, and (iv) Cw ≥ 0. The analysis identifies two candidate solutions:
Solution 1 (PLn = 1 − δ): We solve λ1 ≥ 0 and ∂L∂PLn = 0 simultaneously and get λ1 =
1−3δ−C−fuCw
2(1+δ)






and ΠS∗ = δ(1−C−δ−fuCw)
1+δ
. Solution 2 (PLn > 1 − δ): We solve λ1 = 0 and ∂L∂PLn ≥ 0















We find that the optimal profit of case L1 is greater than that of case L2 when C <
1 − δ + fuCw −
√
2− 2δ (fuCw + δ) or C > 1 − δ + fuCw +
√
2− 2δ (fuCw + δ). We
also find that 1− δ+fuCw +
√
2− 2δ (fuCw + δ) > (1− δ)2 + δfuCw and 1− δ+fuCw +
√
2− 2δ (fuCw + δ) > 1 + δfuCw − δ2 − 2
√
δ (1− δ2) fuCw and that 1 + 3δ − fuCw <
1− δ + fuCw −
√
2− 2δ (fuCw + δ) < (1− δ)2 + δfuCw < 1 + δ − fuCw. As such, we
denote 1 + δ− fuCw as ĈSb and 1− δ+ fuCw −
√
2− 2δ (fuCw + δ) as C̃Lb . Summarizing
above optimal solutions, we have Proposition 3.1.
We next compare the optimal profits when the producer offers short warranties and
that when the producer offers long warranties and refer to ∆B as the difference, i.e., ∆ =
ΠL
∗−ΠS∗. If ∆B > 0, the producer should offer long warranties for greater profits. We first
examine the scenario in which the strategy that customers discard used products is active
regardless of the producer’s warranty length decision. The scenario implies the condition
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Cw = 0, we find that ∆B(fu|Cw = 0) = 0 has 4 roots (i.e., fu = 0, fu = 2, and
fu = 1 ±
√
(1−δ2)(1−C2−δ2)
δ(1−δ2) . We also find that both the irrational roots are /∈ [0, 1] and that
∂∆B(fu|Cw=0)
∂fu
when f → 0 is negative (i.e., ∂∆B(fu|Cw=0)
∂fu
(fu → 0) =
δ2((1−δ2)2−C2)
2(1−δ2)2 and is
negative when C < C̃Lb ), which indicates that ∆B < 0 when fu ∈ [0, 1] and Cw = 0. We
then observe that ∆B decreases in Cw (i.e., ∂∆B∂Cw =
δfu(δfuCw−C+δ2−1)
2(1−δ2) and is negative when
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ fu ≤ 1), which implies that ∆B < 0 always.
We then examine the scenario in which the strategy that customers discard used prod-
ucts is inactive regardless of the producer’s warranty-length decision. We have C >





8(1−(1−fu)δ) . ∆B(fu) = 0 always has 3 real








We exclude one of the non-zero root because it conflicts with C < min(ĈSb , ĈLb ). The other
non-zero root, denoted as f ′B, is positive when
δ(1+δ+C)
2(1+δ)
< Cw < δ. f ′B, is negative when
0 < Cw <
δ(1+δ+C)
2(1+δ)
. In addition, ∂∆B(fu)
∂fu






< Cw < δ, f ′B > 0, ∆B(fu) < 0 when fu < f
′
B, and ∆B(fu) > 0
when fu > f ′B. If 0 < Cw <
δ(1+δ+C)
2(1+δ)
, ∆B(fu) > 0 always. We then summarize above
findings in Corollary 3.1.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
We assume ρ → 1. To check the joint concavity of the producer’s problem if it offers








The first principle minor of the matrix is − 2
1+3(1−fu)δ and is negative when 1 ≥ δ ≥ 0
and 1 ≥ fu ≥ 0. The second principle minor is 4(1−fu)δ(1−(1−fu)δ)(1+3(1−fu)δ)2 and is positive under the
same conditions. Therefore, the matrix is negative definite and indicates that the problem is
concave with respect to the producer’s decision variables. The KKT Lagrangian equation










u)−QSu) = 0, (4)λ2( ∂L∂λ2 ) = 0⇒ λ2Q
S
u = 0,
(5)λ1 ≥ 0, (6)λ2 ≥ 0, (7)QSn(P Sn , QSu) − QSu ≥ 0, and (8)QSu ≥ 0. We also incorporate
following conditions for the feasibility of the solution: (i) 1 > fu > 0, (ii) 1 > δ > 0, and
(iii) C ≥ 0. The analysis identifies four candidate solutions:




simultaneously and get a condition fu ≥ 1+δ−Cδ . The solution has zero profit and therefore
we ignore it.
Solution 2 (QSn(P Sn , QSu) > QSu = 0): λ1 = 0 and λ2 ≥ 0. Additionally, ∂L∂PSn = 0 and
∂L
∂QSu
= 0. We solve them simultaneously and get λ2 =
(1−fu)δ(−1+(1−fu)δ+2C)
1+3(1−fu)δ and following
conditions: (i) fu ≤ 2C−1+δδ when C <
2
3































when C < 2
3


















, and ΠS∗ =
1−(1−fu)δ+C2−2C(1−(1−fu)δ)
4−4δ(1−fu) .




simultaneously and find λ1 = −(1 − fu)δC and a infeasible condition C ≤ 0. Therefore,
we rule out this casesolution.









The first principle minor, − 2
1+3δ
, is negative and the second principle minor, 4δ(1−δ)
(1+3δ)2
, is
positive when 0 < δ < 1. Therefore, the problem is concave with respect to the pro-
ducer’s decision variables. The KKT Lagrangian equation is L = ΠL + λ1(QLn(PLn , QLu)−
QLu) + λ2(Q
L
u). The KKT conditions are: (1)
∂L
∂PLn
= 0, (2) ∂L
∂QLu
= 0, (3)λ1( ∂L∂λ1 ) =
0 ⇒ λ1(QLn − QLu) = 0, (4)λ2( ∂L∂λ2 ) = 0 ⇒ λ2Q
L





u) − QLu ≥ 0, and (8)QLu ≥ 0. Additional conditions are: (i) 1 > fu > 0,
(ii) 1 > δ > 0, (iii) C ≥ 0, and (iv) Cw ≥ 0. The analysis also identifies four candidate
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solutions:




simultaneously and get fu ≥ 1+δ−CCw when C ≥ 1 . We ignore this zero-profit solution.




multaneously and get λ2 =
δ(2C−(1−δ))−(1+δ)fuCw
1+3δ
and following conditions: (i) fu < 1+δ−CCw



















Solution 3 (QLn(PLn , QLu) > QLu > 0): We have λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, ∂L∂PLn = 0, and
∂L
∂QLu
= 0, and get δ(2C−1+δ)
(1+δ)Cw


















































above, we have Proposition 3.2.
B.3 Proof of Corollary 3.3
We refer to ∆NN as the difference in the optimal profits when the buy-back policies are sub-
optimal. ∆NN = ΠL−ΠS . If ∆NN > 0 under a given parameter set {C, Cw, δ, fu}, the pro-
ducer should offer long warranties and then price its products accordingly. ∆NN(fu) = 0












NN ≤ f ′′NN . In addi-
tion, ∆NN(fu) is indeterminate at fu = 1 + 13δ , which is greater than 1 and can be ignored.
Let Cr < δ and C < 1, which implies fNN = 2C−1+δδ . We describe the characteristics of




NN /∈ R, f ′NN > min[1, fNN ], or f ′′NN < 0, ∆NN(fu) < 0 when fu ∈ (0, 1);
(ii) f ′NN < 0 < f
′′
NN < min[1, fNN ]: ∆NN(fu) > 0 when 0 < fu < f
′′
NN and ∆NN(f) < 0
when f ′′NN < fu < min[1, fNN ];
(iii) 0 < f ′NN < f
′′
NN < min[1, fNN ]: ∆NN(fu) < 0 when 0 < fu < f
′
NN and when f
′′
NN <
fu < min[1, fNN ]. ∆NN(fu) > 0 when f ′NN < fu < f
′′
NN ;
(iv) 0 < f ′NN < min[1, fNN ] < f
′′
NN : ∆NN(fu) < 0 when 0 < fu < f
′
NN and ∆NN(fu) > 0
when f ′NN < fu < min[1, fNN ];
(v) f ′NN < 0 < min[1, fNN ] < f
′′
NN : ∆NN(fu) > 0 when fu ∈ (0, 1).






always. When Cw < δ and C > 1, we find f ′NN > 1+δ−Cδ always. All imply
that only case (i) exists. We then examine the cases and their conditions when Cw < δ and





as s1NN(δ, Cw) ,
2(1+3δ)Cw+δ(1−3δ)
3δ

















as s3NN(δ, Cw). s2NN(δ, Cw) ≥ s1NN(δ, Cw) and intersects with s1NN(δ, Cw)
once only at Cw = δ3 . s3NN(δ, Cw) ≥ s1NN(δ, Cw) and intersects with s1NN(δ, Cw) once











when δ > 0.
The conditions are as following:
(i) f ′NN&f
′′
NN /∈ R when C < s1NN(δ, Cw). To have f ′′NN < 0, s1NN(δ, Cw) < C <
s2NN(δ, Cw) and Cw ≤ δ3 . To have f
′







(ii) To have f ′NN < 0 < f
′′
NN < min[1, fNN ], s2NN(δ, Cw) < C < s3NN(δ, Cw);
(iii) To have 0 < f ′NN < f
′′
NN < min[1, fNN ];, s1NN(δ, Cw) < C <
min[s2NN(δ, Cw), s3NN(δ, Cw)];
(iv) To have 0 < f ′NN < min[1, fNN ] < f
′′
NN , s3NN(δ, Cw) < C < s2NN(δ, Cw);
(v) To have f ′NN < 0 < min[1, fNN ] < f
′′
NN , C > max[s2NN(δ, Cw), s3NN(δ, Cw)].
We summarize the above in Corollary 3.3 and illustrate case (iii) in Figure 3.4.
B.4 Sub-optimality of the Full Buy-back Policy
We can straightforwardly show that profits in the full buy-back policy when the producer
offers long warranties equals profits in the partial buy-back policy when the producer offers
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short warranties with δ → 0. In addition, profits in the parital buy-back policy and the no
buy-back policy increase in δ always, which implies that profits in the full buy-back policy
when the producer offers long warranties are always dominated by the optimal profits when
the producer offers short warranties.
B.5 Proof of Corollary 3.4
We also refer to ∆PP as the difference in the optimal profits when the partial buy-back pol-










PP ≤ f ′′PP . In ad-
dition, ∆PP (fu) is indeterminate when fu = 1 − 1δ , which is negative and can be ignored.
We describe the characteristics of ∆PP (fu) in following cases:
(i) f ′PP&f
′′
PP /∈ R, f ′PP > min[fL, 1], or f ′′PP < max[0, fPP ]: ∆PP (fu) > 0 when fu ∈ (0, 1);
(ii) f ′PP < max[0, fPP ] < f
′′
PP < min[f
L, 1]: ∆PP (fu) < 0 when max[0, fPP ] < fu < f ′′PP
and ∆PP (fu) > 0 when f ′′PP < fu < min[fL, 1];
(iii) max[0, fPP ] < f ′PP < f
′′
PP < min[f
L, 1]]: ∆PP (fu) > 0 when max[0, fPP ] < fu < f ′PP
and when f ′′PP < fu < min[fL, 1]. ∆PP (fu) < 0 when f
′
PP < fu < f
′′
PP ;
(iv) max[0, fPP ] < f ′PP < min[fL, 1] < f
′′
PP : ∆PP (fu) > 0 when max[0, fPP ] < fu < f
′
PP
and ∆PP (fu) < 0 when f ′PP < fu < min[fL, 1];
(v) f ′PP < max[0, fPP ] < min[fL, 1] < f
′′
PP : ∆PP (fu) < 0 when fu ∈ (0, 1).
When fPP < 1 and fL > 1, C < 12 , Cw <
δ
2
, and f ′′PP < 1; we have case (i),
(ii), and (iii). Otherwise, when fPP < 1 and fL < 1, f ′′PP > 1; we then have case






























as s2PP (δ, Cw), and
Cw
δ




3/2 , and ends by intersecting with s3PP (δ, Cw) at Cw = δ2 . We further summa-




PP /∈ R when C > s1PP (δ, Cw). To have f ′′PP < max[0, fPP ], s2PP (δ, Cw) < C <
s1PP (δ, Cw) when Cw > 1
2( 1δ )
3/2 . In addition, f ′PP < min[fL, 1] always;
(ii) To have f ′PP < max[0, fPP ] < f
′′
PP < 1 (and 1 < fL), s3PP (δ, Cw) < C < s2PP (δ, Cw);
(iii) To have max[0, fPP ] < f ′PP < f
′′
PP < 1 (and 1 < fL), max[s2PP (δ, Cw), s3PP (δ, Cw)] <
C < s1PP (δ, Cw) when Cw < 1
2( 1δ )
3/2 ;
(iv) To have max[0, fPP ] < f ′PP < fL < f
′′
PP (and fL < 1), s2PP (δ, Cw) < C < s3PP (δ, Cw);
(v) If f ′PP < max[0, fPP ] < fL < f
′′
PP (and fL < 1), C < min[s2PP (δ, Cw), s3PP (δ, Cw)].
We summarize the above in Corollary 3.4 and illustrate case (iii) in Figure 3.5.
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APPENDIX C
TABLES OF RESULTS FOR ROBUSTNESS CHECKS IN CHAPTER 4
Table C.1: Un-weighted used-vehicle reliability
Model 1-1 Model 1-2 Model 1-3 Model 1-4











Lagged UsedTradeV olume -0.099
(0.060)
Observations 198 198 177 158
χ2 43.46 42.36 26.13
R2 0.2298
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table C.2: Alternative used-vehicle reliability
Model 2-1 Model 2-2 Model 2-3 Model 2-4 Model 2-5 Model 2-6





UsedReliability NonPower -0.308∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.240)
UsedReliability Power -1.594∗∗∗ 2.228∗∗
(0.315) (0.732)
Lagged UsedTradeV olume -0.116 -0.101
(0.083) (0.067)
Observations 198 198 177 177 158 158
χ2 56.87 21.43 20.41 35.75
R2 0.1509 0.1860
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table C.3: Additional tests for secondary market trade volume
Model 3-1 Model 3-2 Model 3-3
Variables V OT V OT ′ UsedTradeV olume
UsedReliability 0.632∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.163) (0.167)
Lagged V OT -0.222∗∗∗
(0.063)
Lagged V OT ′ -0.202∗∗∗
(0.00)
Lagged UsedTradeV olume 0.614∗∗∗
(0.097)
Observations 160 160 158
R2 0.2218 0.2135
χ2 4179
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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